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Introduction
While the concept of rational expectations has become the standard tool of modelling
expectations in macroeconomic models, it has been criticised for its high information and
rationality requirements. Moreover, rational expectations is an equilibrium concept which
does not answer the question how the equilibrium can be reached. As a consequence there
has been an increasing interest in learning theory in economics in recent years. This thesis
focuses on a particular concept of learning which is called adaptive learning.
Rational expectations are often criticised to require too much information on part of the
economic agents. It is assumed that they know the structure of the economy, the history
of all endogenous and exogenous variables and all parameter values. The literature on
adaptive learning reduces these informational requirements. The agents are still assumed to
know the history of all variables. It is also assumed that they are endowed with some model
of the economy which they use to forecast the future path of the endogenous variables. This
forecasting model can be a an arbitrary function of past endogenous and past and current
exogenous variables. In the literature it is usually referred to as the perceived law of motion
of the economy. Unlike under rational expectations the agents do not know the correct
values of their perceived law of motion. Instead they try to infer these parameters from
the data they observe using some learning algorithm. Popular adaptive learning algorithms
include recursive least squares and stochastic gradient learning. Given some estimates for
the perceived law of motion the agents use the perceived law of motion to forecast the
future path of the endogenous variables. These expectations together with the history of
endogenous and exogenous variables determine the actual law of motion of the economy.
Subsequently a new set of exogenous variables realises. The new realisation of endogenous
and exogenous variables enables the agents to update the estimates for their perceived law
of motion and the process starts all over. Under certain conditions on the structure of the
economy and the perceived law of motion the forecasts of the agents converge towards
rational expectations.
This thesis contributes to three related branches of the literature, which are described in
the following. The first investigates the conditions under which convergence occurs. Once
we know these conditions we can investigate whether the design of monetary or fiscal
policy has an impact on the convergence of adaptive learning. Finally, adaptive learning
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may be used to explain empirical observations which are difficult to reconcile with rational
expectations.
I.1. Convergence of Adaptive Learning and E-stability
One of the first papers on least squares learning was the paper by Bray and Savin (1986),
who investigate the convergence of least squares learning towards rational expectations in
the cobweb model. The paper demonstrates that even in the very simple cobweb model it
is extremely difficult to prove the convergence of an adaptive learning algorithm. Initiated
by the work of Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b) it has been shown in a sequence of papers
that convergence of least squares learning towards rational expectations is equivalent to the
stability of a certain differential equation (ODE), which is called the mean dynamics or
mean ODE.1
A collection of different convergence results and various applications can be found in
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). All these convergence results relate the problem of conver-
gence of an adaptive learning algorithm like recursive least squares to the local stability of
the mean ODE. It is often possible to prove that the mean ODE is stable if and only if a
smaller and simpler ODE is stable. The stability of the smaller ODE has become known
as E-stability. In most cases it is possible to apply standard stability results for differen-
tial equations to investigate E-stability. The conditions which have to be checked and the
computational effort are then comparable to the analysis of local determinacy. Chapter 1
presents an application of these conditions to a model of monetary and fiscal policy.
Under particular circumstances it can however be very hard to check E-stability. Tech-
nically this is the case whenever the ODE defining E-stability is non-hyperbolic. Economi-
cally this is the case if the equilibrium is not locally unique, for example due to the presence
of sunspots. This is particulary disturbing because it is controversial in the economic liter-
ature whether sunspots are worrisome or whether they are simply a mathematical artefact.
Therefore it would be very desirable to know whether sunspot equilibria are learnable or
not. Apart from the problems with the analysis of E-stability there is no prove in the liter-
ature so far which shows that E-stability governs the convergence of least squares learning
also if the equilibrium is not locally unique. Chapter 2 presents new results on E-stability
and the convergence of least squares learning for two prominent representations of locally
non-unique sunspot equilibria, general form and common factor representations. Our re-
sults support the hypothesis which has been formulated in the literature that E-stability
continues to determine the convergence of least squares learning even in the presence of
locally non-unique sunspot equilibria.
1The equivalence is subject to certain regularity conditions like stationarity of the equilibrium.
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Under least squares learning the weight on a new observation decreases with the total
number of observations. This is because ordinary least squares assumes that the coefficients
which are estimated remain constant over time. If the agents doubt that the structure is
indeed constant, then they may want to put more weight on recent observations to track
structural changes. In most cases these structural changes are breaks in the conduct of
monetary or fiscal policy. Chapter 3 shows that least squares learning with a constant gain
is able to track breaks in monetary policy. A theoretical justification for least squares with
a constant gain has been brought forward by Sargent and Williams (2005). They show that
recursive least squares with a constant gain is approximately optimal if the coefficients to
be estimated follow a random walk.
Another interesting phenomenon may arise if some agents, e.g. the households or the
central bank, have a misspecified perceived law of motion. In these cases the economy may
still converge to a so called self-confirming equilibrium. In a self-confirming equilibrium
the new data which becomes available to the agents validates their beliefs, so that they can-
not detect the misspecification given their model of the economy. If in addition the agents
use a constant gain learning algorithm, then escapes may occur. That is there may be large
and recurring departures from the self-confirming equilibrium. Given the misspecification
and the fact that agents try to track structural changes it is perhaps not too surprising that
escapes do occur. The remarkable thing about escapes is that the escape path is predictable.
An escape can be triggered by a sequence of large shocks which drive the beliefs away from
the self-confirming equilibrium in the direction of the most likely escape path. In order to
achieve this the shocks must be correlated in the right way. A detailed description of the
technical details can be found in Williams (2001).
I.2. E-Stability and Policy Design
A large part of the literature on adaptive learning investigates the E-stability of rational
expectations equilibria across different economic models. It is often argued that any reason-
able equilibrium should be learnable by adaptively learning agents. Equilibria which are
E-unstable cannot be attained by adaptively learning agents and so they can be completely
disregarded. This argument uses adaptive learning as a tool for equilibrium justification.
However, in many models the equilibrium depends on parameters chosen by some policy-
maker and often the policymaker can implement an E-stable equilibrium by choosing an
appropriate policy. The policymaker should then choose an E-stable equilibrium to avoid
unnecessary fluctuations in the expectations of the agents which lead to higher volatility in
aggregate economic variables like output and inflation.
E-stability is a local property of a model and for most applications it is not possible
to derive global stability results. In order to exclude the possibility that there are multiple
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learnable equilibria it is useful to check both E-stability and determinacy simultaneously.
Perhaps the most influential paper which analyses E-stability and determinacy jointly is
Bullard and Mitra (2002), who investigate the effect of different interest rate rules in a
New Keynesian model. Their main result is that monetary policy should follow the Taylor
principle in order to implement a determinate and E-stable equilibrium. In Bullard and
Mitra (2007) they demonstrate that inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy
and promote E-stability.
Chapter 1 compares the E-stability and determinacy properties of monetarist and fiscal-
ist equilibria. There is a dispute in the literature about the plausibility of fiscalist equilib-
ria. Many authors doubt the feasibility of fiscalist equilibria, but only recently McCallum
(2001) claimed that they are implausible because they are not attainable by adaptively learn-
ing agents. Evans and Honkapohja (2004) however present a flexible price model where
both fiscalist and monetarist equilibria may be stable under learning. We analyse this issue
in chapter 1 in a standard New Keynesian model. Our results support the view that fiscalist
equilibria are indeed stable under learning for certain combinations of monetary and fiscal
policy. We also show that a failure of policy coordination may lead to instability under
learning.
Another important result of the literature on E-stability and determinacy is the instabil-
ity of fundamentals based interest rate rules. As shown by Evans and Honkapohja (2003)
all interest rate rules which condition only on exogenous variables lead to E-instability and
indeterminacy. Especially this is true for the optimal policy under discretion. It is however
possible to write the optimal rule under discretion as a function not only of the exogenous
variables but also of expected inflation and the expected output gap. It turns out that this al-
ternative formulation leads to both determinacy and E-stability (cf. Evans and Honkapohja,
2003).
I.3. Empirical Applications of Adaptive Learning
Recently there has been a growing interest in the additional dynamics introduced by
learning. The majority of this part of the learning literature assumes that the agents in
the economy use some constant gain learning algorithm, which is able to track structural
changes and leads to perpetual learning. As noted above recursive least squares places a
decreasing weight on new observations. We have also discussed that least squares learning
has been shown to converge to an E-stable rational expectations equilibrium for a large
class of models. A prerequisite for this is however that the structure of the economy re-
mains constant over time. In contrast a constant gain algorithm puts more weight on recent
information and an exponentially declining weight on old information. Constant gain al-
gorithms can be justified as an approximately optimal algorithm provided the coefficients
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to be estimated follow a random walk. In the absence of any breaks it can be shown (again
under some regularity assumptions on the model and the learning algorithm) that constant
gain algorithms converge in distribution to an E-stable equilibrium. For the agents the
advantage of those algorithms is that they can track parameter changes, while the cost to
pay for that is that the algorithm converges only in distribution to an E-stable equilibrium,
which means that the fluctuations around the equilibrium will never disappear. From the
point of view of an economist constant gain algorithms lead to perpetual learning. Thus
constant gain learning may explain repeated and substantial deviations from rational expec-
tations as well as the transition from one equilibrium to another subsequent to a structural
break.
Some important contributions in this area of research are Cho et al. (2002) and Prim-
iceri (2005) who model the Great Inflation in the US during the 70s and 80s using escape
dynamics. A crucial difference between both papers is that in Cho et al. (2002) the escape
is from high to low inflation, so as time goes by inflation should return to the high levels
of the 70s and 80s. In contrast Primiceri (2005) presents a model where the high levels of
inflation are the escapes, so that the low level of inflation we experience at the moment rep-
resents the equilibrium. Bullard and Cho (2005) build a model of the liquidity trap in Japan
also using escape dynamics. Adam et al. (2006) and Guidolin and Timmermann (2007)
investigate whether adaptive learning can explain stylised facts from the asset pricing lit-
erature which are hard to reconcile with the standard models under rational expectations.
Their results indicate that adaptive learning improves the ability to replicate these stylised
facts but the extent to which this is case is still controversial. Chapter 3 demonstrates that
the Great Moderation, that is the long and large decline of aggregate economic volatility
over the last decades, can be modelled as the transition under learning from an equilibrium
with high volatility to low volatility in response to a break in monetary policy under Fed
chairman Paul Volcker.
I.4. Outlook
The rest of this thesis is divided in three chapters each of which is self-contained. Chap-
ter 1 studies the determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibria in a New
Keynesian model with interacting authorities. Monetary policy controls the nominal inter-
est rate via a linear feedback rule that depends on lagged, contemporaneous or forward data
of inflation and the output gap. Taxes are set as a linear function of real government debt.
There are two kinds of equilibria, monetarist and fiscalist equilibria. We find that learnabil-
ity requires that both authorities coordinate their policies. If monetary policy is active and
fiscal policy is passive the orthodox monetarist equilibrium is the unique learnable equilib-
rium. If on the other hand fiscal policy is active and monetary policy is passive then there
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is a unique learnable fiscalist equilibrium. In case of lagged or forward data in the interest
rate rule determinacy and learnability require in addition that the nominal interest rate is
not too sensitive to fluctuations in the output gap. These results demonstrate that in contrast
to the claim of McCallum (2001) adaptive learning may converge to a fiscalist equilibrium
in one of the most widely used models for monetary policy analysis. Chapter 1 contributes
to the literature on E-stability and determinacy. It applies E-stability both as a justification
for fiscalist equilibria as well as to give policy recommendations in an environment where
both monetary and fiscal policies are rule based.
Chapter 2 investigates the stability under learning of general form and common factor
sunspot representations in self-referential multivariate linear models. It establishes nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for E-stability of common factor sunspot representations
and proves an instability result for general form representations. It is shown that the con-
vergence of least squares learning to a sunspot representation (augmented with projection
facilities) is governed by the stability of the mean ODE. In a standard New Keynesian
model with a forward looking interest rate rule E-stable common factor sunspot repre-
sentations exist if the nominal interest rate is very sensitive to changes in the output gap.
In our calibrated economy least squares learning converges to an E-stable common fac-
tor representation even without imposition of a projection facility. Our results support the
conjecture in the literature that under standard regularity conditions E-stability and conver-
gence of least squares learning are equivalent not only for fundamental equilibria but also
in the presence of sunspots. Thus chapter 2 extends the literature on the convergence of
adaptive learning and E-stability.
Over the last decades most industrialised countries have experienced a tremendous de-
cline in the volatilities of both inflation and aggregate economic activity. Chapter 3 builds
a microfounded model of inflation and the output gap in which information is sticky. The
nominal interest rate is set as a linear feedback rule of inflation and the output gap. The
information acquisition rate is chosen endogenously by adaptively learning agents. We
analyse the consequences of a shift in monetary policy towards more inflation stabilisation
for the volatilities of inflation and the output gap. A simulation exercise shows that in the
long run the model may generate a decline in both volatilities comparable to US data even
if there is a significant volatility trade-off in the short run. Under adaptive learning agents
change their information acquisition rate only gradually. In the short run the information
acquisition rate is essentially fixed and the well-known volatility trade-off prevails. How-
ever, in the long run the shift in monetary policy leads to a reduction of the information
acquisition rate. Thus information disseminates more slowly and the volatility trade-off
may break down.
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CHAPTER 1
Learning about Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules
1.1. Introduction
A policy rule can be defined as ’nothing more than a systematic decision process that
uses information in a consistent and predictable way (Meltzer, 1993, p.223)’. The main
benefit of using a credible policy rule instead of discretion is that it allows the policymaker
to influence the expectations of the agents in the economy so that inflation and output can be
stabilised more efficiently. Although monetary policy rules play a prominent role in modern
macroeconomics this is not the case for fiscal policy rules. Most of the literature on rule
based monetary policy assumes that fiscal policy simply balances the budget. Probably the
reason lies in the predominant view in the literature that inflation is always and everywhere
a monetary phenomenon. However, modelling both monetary and fiscal policy as being
rule based leads to the conclusion that in some circumstances fiscal variables like real
government debt are equally important determinants of inflation (cf. Leeper, 1991). As a
result there has been a controversial debate about the determinants of inflation in recent
years.
On the one hand there are the proponents of the traditional view that inflation is a mon-
etary phenomenon. While these monetarists recognise that a well behaved fiscal policy is
important to achieve price stability, they conjecture that a strong monetary policy authority
can compel fiscal policy not to misbehave. Especially fiscal policy cannot follow a policy
rule which is independent of monetary policy. Monetarists advocate strong independent
central banks with a focus on price stability. In their view this is enough to assure price sta-
bility as fiscal policy has to adapt to fulfill the budget constraint (cf. Sargent and Wallace,
1981).
The diametrically opposed group are the advocates of the fiscal theory of the price
level (FTPL), the so called fiscalists.1 They believe that an independent inflation fighting
central bank is not enough to assure price stability. The conflict with the monetarists arises
because the fiscalists don’t believe that the government budget constraint has to hold for
all possible values of the price level. In their view the budget constraint is an equilibrium
condition, so given some monetary and fiscal policy, the price level adapts to satisfy the
1A comprehensive survey of the FTPL is Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000).
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budget constraint. Thus both monetary and fiscal policy may follow independent policy
rules and price stability hinges on the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy.
A prominent case of the FTPL states that the price level is entirely determined by fiscal
variables if monetary policy fixes the money supply (cf. e.g. Sims (1999) or McCallum
(2001)). This is the most unorthodox example of the FTPL. McCallum (2001) develops a
model for this type of the FTPL and argues that it is implausible for two reasons. First,
while the fiscalist solution exists, it is a bubble solution whereas the orthodox monetarist
solution represents the MSV solution. More fundamental in his view the monetarist solu-
tion is learnable by adaptively learning agents whereas the fiscalist solution is not. 2
The models of Sims (1999) and McCallum (2001) describe the most extreme version of
the FTPL. There are less radical models of the FTPL where in equilibrium both monetary
as well as fiscal variables affect inflation. In these cases it is important to distinguish be-
tween active and passive monetary and fiscal policy. According to Leeper (1991) monetary
policy is active (AM) if it leans against inflation and raises interest rates more than one for
one with inflation and passive (PM) otherwise. This condition is also known as the Taylor
principle. Fiscal policy is said to be passive (PF) if an increase in government debt leads to
an increase in taxes larger than the real interest paid on the additional debt and active (AF)
otherwise.3 Leeper (1991) showed that there are stationary equilibria where fiscal policy is
active, monetary policy is passive and inflation depends on both monetary and fiscal policy.
Specifically he showed that there is a determinate REE if and only if monetary policy is
active and fiscal policy is passive or vice versa. The distinguishing feature of the determi-
nate solutions under active fiscal and passive monetary policy is that inflation depends on
the level of outstanding real government debt. Therefore they are called fiscalist solutions
in contrast to the orthodox monetarist solutions, in which inflation is independent of fis-
cal variables. The distinction between fiscalist and monetarist solutions follows McCallum
(2001) and Evans and Honkapohja (2004). 4
Following Bullard and Mitra (2002) we analyse the determinacy and learnability of
rational expectations equilibria in a standard new Keynesian model for different interest
rate rules that respond to lagged data, contemporaneous data and forward expectations of
inflation and the output gap. Bullard and Mitra (2002) follow the standard procedure and
assume that fiscal policy balances the budget using lump sum taxes and is thus irrelevant for
2Woodford (2003a) argues that the E-instability of the fiscalist solution found by McCallum (2001) re-
sults from the fact that McCallum uses a restricted class of perceived laws of motion that exclude the possi-
bility of a fiscalist solution by assumption.
3A precise definition of active and passive monetary and fiscal policy is given in definition 1.4.1 for
monetary policy and in definition 1.5.1 for fiscal policy.
4The definition of monetarist and fiscalist solutions (cmp. definition 1.5.2) follows Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2004).
8
the analysis of determinacy and learnability. In contrast, we assume that the government
sets lump sum taxes using a linear feedback rule of real government debt as proposed by
Leeper (1991). As a consequence fiscal policy can no longer be disregarded and will have
important effects on both determinacy and learnability. Especially, it allows for the possi-
bility of both active and passive fiscal policy and thus the existence of fiscalist equilibria.
As mentioned above the model of Leeper (1991) covers a wide range of combinations
of monetary and fiscal policy. Especially there are stationary equilibria in which both mon-
etary and fiscal variables affect inflation. So the model is a less extreme version of the
FTPL than the one investigated by McCallum (2001). Following the instability result of
McCallum (2001), Evans and Honkapohja (2004) examine learnability in a model that is
close to the one presented by Leeper (1991) and find that the fiscalist solution is learnable
under active fiscal and passive monetary policy. If both policies are active the equilibrium
is explosive. Yet if monetary policy is sufficiently active the monetarist equilibrium is still
learnable. Under passive fiscal and active monetary policy they find that the monetarist
solution is learnable. However the analysis is based on a constant endowment economy
with flexible prices. Additionally the monetary policy authority is restricted to use a mone-
tary feedback rule that depends on current period inflation. While this is a sensible starting
point and a simple model to derive analytical results, it is not clear how the results change
in models with price stickiness or when the monetary policy authority uses different policy
rules. It is well known that determinacy and E-stability are very sensitive to the specific
type of feedback rule employed by the central bank and that output stabilisation is a crucial
determinant for determinacy and learnability (cf. Bullard and Mitra, 2002). Therefore this
chapter extends the work of Evans and Honkapohja (2004) to a standard New Keynesian
model with an intertemporal IS-curve, where the monetary feedback rule may depend on
both inflation and the output gap.
It turns out that under passive fiscal policy only monetarist equilibria may be learnable,
whereas under active fiscal policy only fiscalist equilibria can be learnable. A determinate
and learnable equilibrium obtains if monetary policy is active (i.e. the Taylor principle
holds) and the nominal interest rate is not too sensitive to changes in the output gap. Under
active fiscal the nominal interest rate still should not be too sensitive too output gap changes
but in addition monetary policy needs to be passive to assure that there is a determinate
and learnable equilibrium. There is no learnable equilibrium if both policies are either
passive or active. If both policies are active then learnability fails because the equilibrium
is explosive.
Comparing our results to the previous literature we find that under passive fiscal policy
the conditions for determinacy and learnability on the parameters of the Taylor rule are
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identical to those found by Bullard and Mitra (2002). More interestingly fiscalist equilib-
ria may well be learnable if monetary policy is passive and fiscal policy is active. This
is in contrast to the claim of McCallum (2001), but in line with the results of Evans and
Honkapohja (2004). However, unlike Evans and Honkapohja (2004) we find that there are
no learnable equilibria if both policies are active. Therefore the monetary and fiscal author-
ity need to coordinate their policies if they want to implement a learnable equilibrium.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model and section 1.3
sketches the methodology. Section 1.4 reviews the determinacy and learnability properties
of the model assuming that fiscal policy balances the budget every period and no govern-
ment debt is held in equilibrium. Most results of this section are familiar from Bullard
and Mitra (2002). However we obtain stronger results than Bullard and Mitra (2002) for
determinacy in case of interest rate rules with lagged and forward data. The results of this
section serve as a benchmark for section 1.5. Section 1.5 is the main contribution of the
chapter. It extends the results of Bullard and Mitra (2002) to the case where lump sum
taxes follow the aforementioned feedback rule and equilibrium bond holdings are positive.
Finally section 1.6 concludes.
1.2. The Model
This section introduces a cashless New Keynesian model with sticky prices. 5 6 Firms
are monopolistically competitive and prices are adjusted according to Calvo (1983) stag-
gered price setting. The government consists of a monetary and a fiscal authority. Monetary
policy is implemented via one of three feedback rules responding to lagged, contempora-
neous or expected future variables. Fiscal policy is conducted according to a feedback rule
that reacts to outstanding government liabilities as originally proposed by Leeper (1991).
Note that nominal variables will be denoted by upper case letters and real variables by
lower case letters. Denoting the aggregate price index by Pt , a nominal variable Vt and
the corresponding real variable vt are related via vt = Vt/Pt . Logarithmic deviations from
steady states will be marked with a hat.
5In a cashless economy without monetary frictions the interest rate is set by varying the yield on the
monetary base and not by open market operations. Arbitrage assures that other riskless assets need to pay the
same yield. Although this means that there must be a positive monetary base even in a cashless economy we
do not have to distinguish it from other government liabilities like riskless nominal bonds, so that no separate
state variable for money will be needed. A detailed discussion is given by Woodford (2003b) chapter 2.1.
6We have computed the results for a calibrated economy with money introduced via the utility function
and the baseline specification where interest rates are set as a feedback rule of contemporaneous data. The
results are undistinguishable from the case of a cashless economy.
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1.2.1. Households. The typical household maximises his expected discounted lifetime
utility
E0
[ ∞
∑
t=0
β tu(ct , lt)
]
, β ∈ (0,1), (1)
where E0 is the conditional expectation as of time 0, β is the rate of time preference and
u(·) is the per period utility given by
u(ct , lt) =
c1−σct −1
1−σc − γ
l1+σlt +1
1+σl
, γ ≥ 0. (2)
The household derives utility from consumption ct and leisure 1− lt , where lt ∈ (0,1)
denotes hours worked. The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in both
arguments and of the constant elasticity type. The parameters σc and σl are the inverse
intertemporal elasticities of substitution of consumption and leisure. The maximisation is
subject to the budget constraint
Bt +Ptct +Ptτt ≤ Ptwt lt +Rt−1Bt−1+Ωt . (3)
The household receives income from labour Ptwt lt , dividends Ωt from the firms and gross
interest payments Rt−1Bt−1 from nominal bond holdings. It pays taxes for Ptτt and con-
sumption Ptct and invests in end of period nominal bond holdings Bt . Denoting inflation
by pit = Pt/Pt−1 the budget constraint in real terms is
bt + ct + τt = wt lt +pi−1t Rt−1bt−1+Ωt/Pt . (4)
The FOCs and the transversality condition of the household’s problem are
wtc
−σc
t = γl
σl
t , (5)
c−σct = βRtEt [c
−σc
t+1 /pit+1], (6)
0 = lim
t→∞β
tuct bt . (7)
1.2.2. Firms. There is a continuum i ∈ (0,1) of monopolistically competitive firms.
Aggregate output yt is defined as
yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
y(ε−1)/εit di
)ε/(ε−1)
,
where yit is the differentiated good produced by firm i and ε is the elasticity of substitution
between any two goods. Cost minimisation yields the goods demand yit = (Pit/Pt)−εyt for
good i, where
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P(1−ε)it di
)1/(1−ε)
(8)
is the aggregate price index. Output is a linear function of labour input so that yit = lit . The
pricing of firms is assumed to follow Calvo (1983). Every period each firm adjusts its price
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only with probability 1−θ . A firm i that does not adjust its price sets its price according
to Pit = piPit−1, where pi is steady state inflation (see Yun, 1996). As demonstrated by Galí
(2002), profit maximisation leads to
pˆit = λ mˆct +βEt pˆit+1, (9)
where λ = (1− θ)(1−βθ)/θ > 0 and mct are average real marginal costs. We assume
that employment is subsidised at a constant rate ν . Hence marginal costs are given by
mct = ν−1wt . (10)
Let lt =
∫ 1
0 litdi then it can be shown that yˆt = lˆt (cf. Galí, 2002). Combining this equation
with (5), (10) and the aggregate resource constraint yt = ct +gt yields
mˆct = (σy+σl)yˆt−σy gy gˆt , (11)
where σy ≡ y/cσc is the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate ex-
penditure. Under flexible prices, a profit maximising firm with an isoelastic demand curve
chooses a markup of µ = ε1−ε . It follows that in a flexible price equilibrium marginal costs
will be constant and equal to the inverse of the markup, i.e. mct = µ−1. Together with (11)
this means that potential output under flexible prices yˆpt is given by
yˆpt = σy/(σy+σl)
g
y
gˆt . (12)
Assume that the employment subsidy exactly offsets the distortion associated with monop-
olist competition (i.e. ν = µ). Then the flexible price allocation coincides with the efficient
allocation. Define zt = yt − ypt to be the output gap. Now we have from (11) and (12) that
marginal costs are proportionate to the output gap
mˆct = (σy+σl)zˆt . (13)
1.2.3. Government. The government issues nominal bonds Bt and collects taxes Ptτt
from the household. It repays bond holdings RtBt−1 of the previous period including in-
terest and finances government expenditures Ptgt . Thus the flow budget constraint of the
government is5
Bt +Ptτt = Ptgt +Rt−1Bt−1. (14)
Government bonds Bt+i are subject to the solvency constraint limi→∞(Bt+i∏i−1s=0 R
−1
t+s) = 0.
Following Leeper (1991), lump sum taxes are set according to the tax rule
τt = γ0+ γ1bt−1. (15)
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We assume throughout that γ0 ≥ g and 0 < γ1 < β−1, where g are steady state government
expenditures and β−1 the gross real interest rate in the steady state. Substituting the tax
rule (15) in (14) the budget constraint in real terms is
bt + γ0+ γ1bt−1 = pi−1t Rt−1bt−1+gt . (16)
In order to assess the consequences for determinacy and learnability monetary policy will
be allowed to choose one out of three types of linear feedback rules for the nominal interest
rate Rt . Following Bullard and Mitra (2002) we compare lagged, contemporaneous and
future data rules
Rˆt = φpi pˆit−1+φzzˆt−1, Rˆt = φpi pˆit +φzzˆt and Rˆt = φpiEt pˆit+1+φzEt zˆt+1. (17)
Throughout this chapter we will assume that φpi and φz are nonnegative. Finally government
expenditures follow the logarithmic AR(1) process
loggt = ρ loggt−1+(1−ρ) logg+ηt , ρ ∈ (0,1), (18)
where ηt is white noise.
1.2.4. The Log-Linearised Model. The model can be log-linearised around its non-
stochastic steady state. Once interest rates have been set via one of the three types of rules
(17) the deviations of output, inflation and bonds from steady state are
pˆit = κ zˆt +βEt pˆit+1, (19)
zˆt = Et zˆt+1−σ−1y (Rˆt−Et pˆit+1)+(1−ρ)
(
1+ σy
σy+σl
)
g
y
gˆt , (20)
bˆt = (β−1− γ1)bˆt−1−β−1(pˆit− Rˆt−1)+ gb gˆt , (21)
where κ ≡ λ (σy+σl). Government expenditures follow the AR(1) process gˆt = ρ gˆt−1+εt .
Equation (19) is a New Keynesian Philips curve and (20) is an intertemporal IS curve.
Finally (21) is the log-linear approximation of the government budget constraint (16) for a
cashless economy. It will be assumed that κ and σy are positive and that 0 < β < 1.
Note that equations (17), (19) and (20) can be interpreted as a model where fiscal
policy is extremely passive and balances the budget every period. We will subsequently
call this model the ‘no bonds’ case, in contrast to the full model including equation (21),
which will be labelled as the case of ‘positive bonds’.
1.2.5. Calibration. In order to assure comparability the parameters in the benchmark
without bonds are set as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). The discount factor β is set to 0.99.
The inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution σy is set to 0.157 and the compound
parameter κ = λ (σy+σl) is set to 0.024. Both parameters are estimates from Rotemberg
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and Woodford (1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). Finally we take the estimate
of ρ = 0.95 for the AR(1) coefficient in government expenditures from Galí (2002).
1.3. Methodology
For the analysis of determinacy the model is written in first order form
Axt = Bxt+1+Cut +Dηt+1, (22)
where xt is a vector of endogenous variables, ut is a vector of exogenous variables and
ηt+1 = xt+1−Etxt+1 is the vector collecting the forecast errors. The model is determinate
if there is a unique non-explosive solution, indeterminate if there are multiple non-explosive
solutions and explosive otherwise. 7 According to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) the model
is (locally) determinate if the number of eigenvalues of A−1B inside the unit circle equals
the number of jump variables, it is (locally) indeterminate if there are fewer eigenvalues
inside the unit circle than jump variables and explosive otherwise . A jump variable is a
variable that is not pinned down by an initial condition. Therefore additional restrictions are
needed to identify a unique solution. If there are explosive roots in the system, then some
endogenous variables will explode unless a certain linear restriction (a non-explosiveness
condition) holds. Provided a specific regularity condition holds the endogenous variables
are uniquely identified if the sum of initial conditions and non-explosiveness conditions
is equal to the number of endogenous variables. 8 Following the literature we will call
a variable that is restricted by an initial condition a predetermined variable. As noted by
Sims (2001) the number of jump variables can be read of the system (22) and is equal to
the rank of the matrix D. 9
Regarding learnability we follow the methodology introduced by Marcet and Sargent
(1989b) and further developed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Compared to the rational
expectations benchmark, agents do not know the distribution of the variables they need
to forecast. Instead they specify a perceived law of motion for the economy, which is
7One may argue for an alternative definition of determinacy especially in case of government bonds,
which, by transversality condition (7), are permitted to grow exponentially at a rate of β . However, in this
case the local analysis (especially the linearisation) would no longer be valid and so we adapt the more
restrictive definition that requires all quantities to be stationary (cf. Woodford, 2003a, p.314 footnote 76).
8By regularity condition we mean the rank condition given in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), which assures
that each explosive root can be associated with a jump variable. If this condition does not hold, it may e.g.
happen that there is an explosive root in an equation where there are only predetermined variables. Then the
system will explode even if the number of jump variables equals the number of explosive roots.
9As a technical remark note that all theorems in this chapter consider only generic cases. In case of
determinacy this amounts to the assumption that none of the characteristic polynomials is self-reciprocal.
One special case of self-reciprocity is that roots lie on the unit circle (cf. appendix A.1.2.1 and Henrici
(1988) p.496).
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continuously adapted to the data via recursive least squares. Thus each time agents receive
a new piece of information, they update their PLM and use it to form their expectations.
The expectations in turn feed back into the system and change the law of motion of the
economy. The question that arises is under which conditions convergence occurs and where
this process converges to.
Formally we follow Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and rewrite the model in second
order form as
xt = Γ0+Γ1Etxt+1+Γ2xt−1+Γ3ut , (23)
where xt is a vector of endogenous variables, ut = ϕut−1+εt is a vector of exogenous vari-
ables which are assumed to follow a stationary VAR. Thus εt is white noise and all roots of
ϕ are inside the unit circle. A big issue in the learning literature is the information set that
the expectation in equation (23) is conditioned on. There are three standard alternatives.
The perhaps most obvious is to use all information on endogenous and exogenous variables
as of time t, i.e. to define Etxt := E[xt |It ] where It = {xs,us,εs}ts=0 is the information avail-
able at time t (called t-dating). A widespread alternative is to assume that agents only have
information as of time t− 1, i.e. replace Etxt+1 in (23) by Et−1xt+1 (called t− 1-dating).
This approach is popular in the learning literature because it ’avoids a simultaneity between
expectations and current values of endogenous variables which may seem more natural in
the context of the analysis of learning (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, p.229)’. The
drawback of modelling learning this way is that most standard models are microfounded
and derived under the assumption of t-dating of information. So the model would have
to be derived again under a different assumption on the timing of information. The third
alternative is to define It = {xs,us,εs}t−1s=0∪{ut ,εt}. In this case the agents are assumed to
possess information up to time t on the exogenous variables but only up to time t−1 on the
endogenous variables. Obviously this mixed dating assumption avoids the simultaneity and
above all it is equivalent to t-dating under rational expectations (cf. Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, p.237). Therefore this is the information assumption we will adopt subsequently.
In order to form expectations agents need to specify a perceived law of motion (PLM)
for the variables they wish to forecast. The PLM of the agents is assumed to be of the form
xt = c0+ c1xt−1+ c2ut , (24)
where c0, c1 and c2 are unrestricted matrices of conformable size. An important fact to
remember is that learnability does depend on the choice of the PLM. But if an equilibrium
is learnable within a certain class of PLMs then it is also learnable in all nested classes. It
may though be the case that an equilibrium that is learnable in a small class of PLMs is
not learnable in a larger class that includes this PLM. Finally it is obviously not possible to
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learn an equilibrium that is not included in the class of PLMs. 10 Accordingly if learnability
is used to select among different equilibria, then it is important that they are all included in
the PLM. Assuming mixed dating and the PLM (24) forecasts are build according to
Etxt+1 = c0+ c1Etxt + c2Etut+1 (25)
= (I+ c1)c0+ c21xt−1+(c1c2+ c2ϕ)ut (26)
and so the actual law of motion is
xt =
(
Γ0+Γ1(I+ c1)c0
)
+
(
Γ2+Γ1c21
)
xt−1+
(
Γ1(c1c2+ c2ϕ)+Γ3
)
ut (27)
= T (c0,c1,c2)(1,x′t−1,u
′
t)
′ (28)
implicitly defining the mapping T (c0,c1,c2) from perceived to actual parameters. Note
that the symbol I denotes the identity matrix of conformable size. The fixed points of the
mapping T (c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = (c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) are REE of the form (24) and implicitly defined by 11 12
(I−Γ1−Γ1c¯1)c¯0 = Γ0, (29)
(I−Γ1c¯1)c¯1 = Γ2, (30)
(I−Γ1c¯1)c¯2−Γ1c¯2ϕ = Γ3. (31)
It can be shown that the convergence of recursive least squares is governed by the stability
of the following matrix differential equation
d
dτ
(c0,c1,c2) = T (c0,c1,c2)− (c0,c1,c2). (32)
Define E-stability to be the local asymptotic stability of the differential equation (32). Then
recursive least squares converges locally to an REE (c¯0, c¯1, c¯2), provided the solution is E-
stable and all roots of c¯1 lie inside the unit circle. The last requirement implies that the
equivalence between E-stability and convergence of recursive least squares holds only if
the REE is stationary. We will see below that the learning algorithm may diverge if the
10As argued by Woodford (2003a) the result of McCallum (2001) that fiscalist solutions are not learnable
is due to the fact that McCallum does not allow inflation to depend on fiscal variables and so they are by
assumption not learnable.
11To show that (29)–(31) are indeed the fixed points of the mapping T (·), note e.g. that c0 = Γ0+Γ1(I+
c1)c0 can be written as c0−Γ1(I+c1)c0 = Γ0, which is obviously the same as (29). Equations (30) and (31)
can be derived similarly.
12Equation (30) is a quadratic matrix equation, which in general will have multiple solutions. However,
given a specific solution c¯1, equation (31) is a linear matrix equation in c¯2 with the generically unique solution
vec(c2) = [I⊗ (I−Γ1c¯1)−ϕ ′⊗Γ1]−1 vec(Γ3).
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REE is nonstationary. The derivatives of the T -map (28) are
DTc0(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = Γ1(I+ c¯1), (33)
DTc1(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = c¯
′
1⊗Γ1+ I⊗Γ1c¯1, (34)
DTc2(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = ϕ
′⊗Γ1+ I⊗Γ1c¯1. (35)
where throughout I denotes an identity matrix of conformable size. Under mixed dating,
an REE (c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) is E-stable if the eigenvalues of all derivatives (33)–(35) have real parts
smaller than one. The converse is also true provided none of the eigenvalues equals one
(for details cf. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, chapter 10).13
Finally note that if Γ2 6= 0 there will be multiple REE because equation (30) is a qua-
dratic matrix equation. In these cases it may be difficult to compute c¯1 and therefore to
check the E-stability conditions (33)–(35). In cases where it is analytically untractable we
will restrict the analysis of learnability to determinate equilibria, which can be computed
using one of the algorithms provided by Sims (2001) or Uhlig (1999). Once the REE is
known, it is easy to evaluate the E-stability conditions (33)–(35).
The following two sections will investigate the determinacy and E-stability conditions
for the model without bonds and the one with positive bond holdings respectively.
1.4. No Bond Holdings
This section considers the case without bond holdings, where the government budget
balances every period and thus fiscal policy is substituted out of the model. Most results
are familiar from Bullard and Mitra (2002) and serve as a benchmark for the model with
positive bond holdings. In case of forward data rules in the policy rule the determinacy
result can be strengthened and in case of lagged data necessary and sufficient conditions are
presented for equilibrium uniqueness, where Bullard and Mitra (2002) report only sufficient
conditions. The case of a government that balances its budget every period is an extreme
instance of passive fiscal policy. As will be seen later the conditions obtained under this
policy continue to describe determinacy and E-stability of the monetarist solutions under
any passive fiscal policy. As determinacy and E-stability will hinge on whether monetary
policy is passive or active, we will now state a formal definition.
DEFINITION 1.4.1. Monetary policy is active if a permanent one percentage point in-
crease in inflation pˆit leads to a permanent increase in the nominal interest rate Rˆt larger
than one percentage point. It is passive otherwise.
From the New Keynesian Philips curve (19) it can be seen that a permanent increase
in inflation by ∆pˆi would go along with a permanent increase in the output gap of ∆zˆ =
13As the E-stability conditions (33)–(35) do not depend on Γ3, it is not reported in the following.
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(1−β )κ−1∆pˆi . Together both effects would lead to a permanent increase in the nominal
interest rate of (φpi+(1−β )κ−1φz)∆pˆi via one of the interest rate rules (17). Thus monetary
policy is active if and only if
φpi +
1−β
κ
φz > 1. (36)
This condition is the extension of the well known Taylor principle (φpi > 1) to the New
Keynesian model. Note that the traditional condition φpi > 1 is sufficient for (36).
1.4.1. Contemporaneous Data Rules. The model with contemporaneous data interest
rate rules can be reduced to a first order system in inflation and the output gap by substitut-
ing Rˆt = φpi pˆit +φzzˆt in the IS curve (20). Then the model can be written in first order form
(22) with xt = (pˆit , zˆt)′ and
A =
[
1 −κ
φpi σy+φz
]
, B =
[
β 0
1 σy
]
. (37)
Determinacy depends on the eigenvalues of A−1B, which is given by
A−1B = 1
φz+σy+φpiκ
[
κ+β (φz+σy) κσy
1−φpiβ σy
]
. (38)
Both the output gap and inflation are jump variables and therefore, the system is determi-
nate if and only if both roots of A−1B are inside the unit circle.
PROPOSITION 1.4.2. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule there is a deter-
minate rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1. (39)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
Thus the model with contemporaneous data in the interest rate rule is determinate if
and only if monetary policy is active. In order to analyse E-stability the model is casted in
second order form, which is given by (23) with xt = (pˆit , zˆt)′, ut = gˆt , α = 0, Γ1 = A−1B,
Γ2 = 0, Γ3 =−A−1C and ϕ = ρ . In the current environment (Γ2 = 0) it is natural to focus
on solutions that like the MSV solution have c¯1 = 0. 14 E-stability requires the eigenvalues
of both DTc0(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) and DTc2(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) to have real parts smaller one. From (33) and
(35) we have DTc0(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = Γ1 = A−1B and DTc2(c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) = ϕ ′⊗Γ1 = ρA−1B. As
ρ < 1 this is equivalent to the requirement that the eigenvalues of A−1B have real parts
smaller one. Determinacy requires the roots of A−1B to be inside the unit circle, so E-
stability is implied by determinacy (in case c¯1 = 0). However, in general (even if c¯1 = 0)
the reverse conclusion does not hold.
14From equation (30) it is obvious that in the current case with Γ2 the MSV solution has c¯1 = 0.
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PROPOSITION 1.4.3. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule the MSV solu-
tion is E-stable if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1. (40)
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
Proposition 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 together show that determinacy and learnability are both
equivalent to active monetary policy. Thus under rules with contemporaneous data learn-
ability also implies determinacy.
1.4.2. Forward Data Rules. Under forward data interest rate rules we can again sub-
stitute the nominal interest rate in the IS curve (20) with Rˆt = φpiEt pˆit+1 + φzEt zˆt+1. The
endogenous variables are inflation and the output gap xt = (pˆit , zˆt)′ and the system matrices
of the first order form (22) are
A =
[
1 −κ
0 σy
]
, B =
[
β 0
1−φpi σy−φz
]
. (41)
For determinacy we are interested in A−1B given by
A−1B = 1
σy
[
κ(1−φpi)+σyβ κ(σy−φz)
1−φpi σy−φz
]
. (42)
Output and inflation are jump variables and so both roots of A−1B need to be inside the unit
circle for determinacy. 15
PROPOSITION 1.4.4. Under a forward data interest rate rule there is a determinate
rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1, (43)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy. (44)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
Note that determinacy requires again that monetary policy is active (43), but it also
requires that the response to the output gap is not too strong (44). As for plausible parameter
values κ(1+ β )−1 is very small equation (44) is primarily a restriction on the feedback
parameter φz of the output gap in the interest rate rule. The feedback of interest rates on
the output gap will also be important under lagged data rules, but as demonstrated above
does not matter in case of contemporaneous data rules. As under interest rate rules with
contemporaneous data the second order form is given by (23) with xt = (pˆit , zˆt)′, ut = gˆt ,
15Note that in addition to the conditions stated in the following proposition Bullard and Mitra (2002)
require that φz < σy(1+β−1). However, as demonstrated in the appendix, this condition is redundant as it is
implied by (44) and (43).
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α = 0, Γ1 = A−1B, Γ2 = 0, Γ3 =−A−1C and ϕ = ρ . Additionally it is again the case that
c¯1 = 0, so that determinacy implies learnability. However this time the reverse is not true
as can be seen from the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1.4.5. Under a forward data interest rate rule the MSV solution is E-
stable if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1. (45)
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
Proposition 1.4.4 and 1.4.5 show that the MSV solution may be E-stable even under
indeterminacy. As under contemporaneous data rules E-stability is equivalent to the con-
dition that monetary policy is active (45). However, to obtain determinacy, forward data
rules require in addition that the feedback of nominal interest rates to the output gap may
not be too large (44). As noted above it is important to look at determinacy and E-stability
jointly because E-stability of one equilibrium does not guarantee that there is no other E-
stable solution. In fact forward data rules are a very prominent example of policy rules
where there are E-stable sunspots. As shown by Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and Evans
and McGough (2005) there are E-stable sunspot solutions if monetary policy is active (45)
and the feedback from the output gap to the nominal interest rate is sufficiently large (i.e.
the converse of (44) holds).
1.4.3. Lagged Data Rules. The reduced form (22) under lagged data interest rate
rules involves the nominal interest rate, inflation and the output gap xt = (Rˆt , pˆit , zˆt)′. The
system matrices are
A =
[
0 φpi φz
0 1 −κ
1 0 σy
]
, B =
[
1 0 0
0 β 0
0 1 σy
]
. (46)
The eigenvalues that determine determinacy are determined by A−1B, where
A−1B = 1
φz+φpiκ
[−σy φpi(κ+σyβ )+φz σy(φz+φpiκ)
κ φzβ 0
1 −φpiβ 0
]
. (47)
Under this regime there are again two jump variables (the output gap and inflation) and one
predetermined variable (the nominal interest rate), so that two eigenvalues must be inside
and one outside the unit circle for determinacy.
PROPOSITION 1.4.6. Under a lagged data interest rate rule there is a determinate
rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz < 1, (48)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz > 2σy (49)
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or
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1, (50)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy. (51)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
To analyse E-stability the model is written in second order form (23). Substituting out
nominal interest rates Rˆt = φpi pˆit + φzzˆt the endogenous and the exogenous variables are
xt = (pˆit , zˆt) and ut = gˆt respectively. The coefficient matrices are α = 0, ϕ = ρ and
Γ1 =
[
β +κσ−1y κ
σ−1y 1
]
, Γ2 =−σ−1y
[
κφpi κφz
φpi φz
]
. (52)
The lags in the interest rate rule lead to c¯1 6= 0. Therefore determinacy does not imply
E-stability. Moreover the conditions for E-stability (33)–(35) depend on the parameters of
the rational expectations equilibrium. However, it is intractable to compute the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium analytically and so there are no analytical results for E-stability. The
numerical results for the calibrated model show that the equilibria in the first determinate
region, where monetary policy is passive (48) but the response too the output gap is not too
small (49) are E-unstable. In contrast the equilibria in the second region of determinacy,
where monetary policy is active (50) and the feedback from the output gap to the nominal
interest rate is not too large (51) are E-stable. As mentioned above the results are the same
as those for the monetarist solution under passive fiscal policy in the model with positive
bond holdings to which we will turn now.
1.5. Positive Bond Holdings
The following section extends the results of Bullard and Mitra (2002) incorporating a
fiscal policy rule (15) in the sense of Leeper (1991). It also extends the work of Evans and
Honkapohja (2004) by including a dynamic IS curve (20) and investigating the effect of
different interest rate rules. In this section determinacy and learnability depend not only on
the specification of the monetary policy rule but also on the properties of the fiscal policy
rule. It will be especially useful to distinguish between active and passive fiscal policy. The
subsequent definition follows Woodford (2003b). 16
DEFINITION 1.5.1. The fiscal policy rule (15) is passive if it implies that {bˆt}, as
determined by the flow budget constraint (21), is bounded for all small enough values of
the endogenous variables {pˆit , Rˆt} and the disturbances {gˆt}. A policy that is not passive is
called active.
16The terms passive and active fiscal policy are introduced by Leeper (1991) and correspond to Riccardian
and non-Riccardian fiscal policies in the sense of Woodford (2003b, p.312).
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From (21) it is obvious that under the tax rule (15) fiscal policy is passive if
γ1 > β−1−1 (53)
and active if the reverse inequality holds. Recall that γ1 is the feedback coefficient of lump
sum taxes on government debt in the previous period. If this coefficient is larger than the
real interest rate, then a shock to real government liabilities is followed by a reduction of
these liabilities in the following period, which is financed via an increase in lump sum
taxes.
In the analysis of the previous section, where we have abstracted from fiscal policy, we
have implicitly assumed that fiscal policy does not affect the conditions for determinacy
and E-stability. By definition 1.5.1 a fiscal policy is passive if it leads to a stationary solu-
tion for government debt for all paths of output and inflation. Thus passive fiscal policies
do not affect the conditions for determinacy. However it is not clear that the conditions for
E-stability also remain unaffected. It will however be shown that a straightforward exten-
sion of the solutions in the no bonds case bonds continues to be determinate and E-stable
under the same conditions as in the previous section provided fiscal policy is passive. This
solution has the property that inflation and output are independent of bonds. Following
Evans and Honkapohja (2004) we will classify such an REE as a monetarist solution as
opposed to a fiscalist solution.
DEFINITION 1.5.2. A fiscalist solution is a rational expectations equilibrium where
inflation pˆit is a function of real bond holdings bˆt . A monetarist solution is a rational expec-
tations equilibrium in which inflation pˆit is independent of real bond holdings bˆt .
The definition captures the fact that active fiscal policy leads to an unstable root in
the bond equation (21). Determinacy however requires the solution not to explode. As a
consequence of the unstable root under active fiscal policy this is only possible if a linear
restriction between inflation, the output gap and bonds holds, i.e. pˆit+k1zˆt+k2bˆt+k3gˆt = 0.
Thus inflation depends on real government debt, which is the fundamental difference be-
tween the fiscalist solutions and the traditional monetarist solutions as analysed by Bullard
and Mitra (2002).
1.5.1. Contemporaneous Data Rules. Under contemporaneous data rules with bonds
the interest rate rule Rˆt = φpi pˆit +φzzˆt can be used to replace the nominal interest rate in the
budget constraint (21). The model then reduces to a system (22) involving xt = (pˆit , zˆt , bˆt)′.
The system matrices are
A =
[
1 −κ 0
φpi σy+φz 0
β−1φpi β−1φz β−1− γ1
]
, B =
[
β 0 0
1 σy 0
β−1 0 1
]
. (54)
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For determinacy we are interested in A−1B, which is given by
A−1B =
κ+β (φz+σy)φz+σy+φpiκ κσyφz+σy+φpiκ 01−βφpi
φz+σy+φpiκ
σy
φz+σy+φpiκ 0
ψ1 ψ2 (β−1− γ1)−1
. (55)
where the specific form of the parameters ψ1 and ψ2 is omitted as they are irrelevant for
determinacy. There are two jump variables and one predetermined variable in xt . For the
model to be determinate two roots of A−1B must be inside and one outside the unit circle.
PROPOSITION 1.5.3. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule there is a deter-
minate rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
γ1 > β−1−1, (56)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1 (57)
or
γ1 < β−1−1, (58)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz < 1. (59)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
Proposition 1.5.3 is the result that is closest to the results of Leeper (1991). It states that
the rational expectations equilibrium is determinate under a contemporaneous data rule in
one of two cases. Either fiscal policy is passive and monetary policy is active or fiscal policy
is active and monetary policy is passive. The above result is the analogue of Leeper’s result
in a flexible price model for a standard New Keynesian model. It was first obtained by
Woodford (1996). Figure 1 shows the determinate, indeterminate and explosive region in
the space of the central bank’s reaction coefficients (φpi ,φz). In order to analyse E-stability
it is convenient to rewrite the model in second order form, which is given by (23) with
xt = (pˆit , zˆt , bˆt), α = 0, ϕ = ρ , ut = gˆt and 17
Γ1 =
1
φz+σ +φpiκ
[
κ+β (φz+σy) κσy 0
1−φpiβ σy 0
−β−1κ−φz−σy −β−1κσy 0
]
, Γ2 =
[
0 0 0
0 0 0
β−1φpi β−1φz β−1− γ1
]
. (60)
Recall that the E-stability conditions (33)–(35) depend on c¯1. Thus we have to compute
the E-stability conditions for every REE (c¯0, c¯1, c¯2) separately. There are seven solutions to
equation (30) and thus seven different REEs. In the analysis of learnability we will focus
on two of these REE, which yield a determinate equilibrium for some values of the policy
parameters (γ1,φpi ,φy). It can be checked numerically that given our calibration they are
17Cf. appendix A.1.1 for the details of the derivation.
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FIGURE 1. determinate (D), indeterminate (ID) and explosive (EX) region
under contemporaneous data rules
also candidates for an E-stable equilibrium, i.e. are E-stable for some choices of the policy
parameters (γ1,φpi ,φy). The remaining five REEs are always E-unstable. The following
proposition computes a closed form solution for these two REE. Not surprisingly one is a
monetarist and the other one is a fiscalist equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1.5.4. Under the conditions (56) and (57) the determinate solution is
the monetarist solution (M) given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = Γ2 and c¯2, where c¯2 is the unique solution
to (31).
Under the conditions (58) and (59) the determinate solution is the fiscalist solution (F)
given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = (φpiv,φyv,βλ3v) and c¯2, where c¯2 is the unique solution to (31) and v
is a column vector reported in appendix A.1.4 equation (A.41).
PROOF. See appendix A.1.4. 
By proposition 1.5.3 there is a determinate solution under passive fiscal policy (56) and
active monetary policy (57). Proposition 1.5.4 establishes that it is a specific monetarist
solution. There is also a determinate region under active fiscal (58) and passive monetary
policy (59) (cf. again proposition 1.5.3). From proposition 1.5.4 we know that the deter-
minate solution under this regime is a certain fiscalist solution. For the monetarist solution
it is possible to compute the E-stability conditions analytically.
PROPOSITION 1.5.5. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule the monetarist
solution is E-stable if and only if
γ1 > β−1−1, (61)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1 (62)
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or
γ1 < β−1−1, (63)
κ(φpi −β−1+ γ1)+ γ1βφz > σyγ1β (β−1− γ1−1), (64)
κ(2−λ3)φpi +(λ3(1−β )+2)φz > σy(λ3(1+β )−2)+κβλ3, (65)
where λ3 = β−1− γ1.
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
Theorems 1.5.3–1.5.5 show that under passive fiscal policy (61) combined with active
monetary policy (62) the monetarist solution is determinate and E-stable. This demon-
strates that the results of the previous section (proposition 1.4.3), where fiscal policy is
extremely passive, generalise to any passive fiscal policy (see figure 2 on the left). More-
over proposition 1.5.5 states that under active fiscal policy (63) the monetarist solution is
E-stable if conditions (64) and (65) hold. In case of the calibrated model shown in figure
2 only condition (64) is binding (cf. the right pane of figure 2). There are two interesting
special cases of condition (64). In the borderline case between active and passive fiscal
policy, where γ1 = β−1− 1, it simplifies to the condition that monetary policy is active
(62). If on the other hand fiscal policy is extremely active γ1 = 0 we have the requirement
φpi > β−1. Figure 2 (on the right) shows an intermediate case where 0 < γ1 < β−1− 1.
Under active fiscal (58) and passive monetary policy (59) the determinate REE is the fis-
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FIGURE 2. E-stability of the monetarist (M) and fiscalist solution (F), E-
instability of all solutions (U) under contemporaneous data rules
calist solution. The E-stability conditions for the fiscalist solution are too complicated to
be solved analytically. The numerical analysis however suggests that the fiscalist solution
is E-unstable under passive fiscal policy. Under active fiscal policy the fiscalist solution
seems to be E-stable if the converse of condition (64) holds. As mentioned above there is
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no other E-stable solution in the calibrated model. It is also interesting to note that there is
no parameterisation of monetary and fiscal policy where both solutions are E-stable.
Up to now we have only investigated E-stability. It remains to check that the conditions
for the equivalence of E-stability and learnability in the sense of convergence of recursive
least squares hold. Apart from certain regularity conditions, which do hold in this setup the
results in the literature require that the equilibrium that is being learned is stationary. In
general E-stability does not guarantee convergence of least squares learning if the equilib-
rium is explosive. As shown in figure 1 this is the case if both monetary and fiscal policy
are active. To check whether convergence still holds we simulate the model for different
values of active monetary and fiscal policies. Figure 3 plots the evolution of inflation, the
output gap and real government bonds under rational expectations (left panel) and under
learning (right panel) for γ1 = 0.006, φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.5. The initial values of the be-
liefs under learning have been chosen close to the monetarist equilibrium. Under rational
expectations inflation and the output gap are stationary and only real government bonds are
explosive. 18 The fact that agents are learning leads to diverging beliefs under learning. As
a consequence inflation and the output gap also diverge as can be seen in the right panel
of figure 3. The simulations we have conducted all suggest that neither the monetarist nor
the fiscalist solution is stable under learning if both policies are active, even if they are E-
stable. Summarising the results for contemporaneous data rules the monetarist solution is
the unique learnable and determinate equilibrium for all active monetary and passive fiscal
policies. The fiscalist solution is the unique E-stable and determinate equilibrium under
passive monetary and active fiscal policy. If both policies are passive the equilibrium is
indeterminate and no equilibrium is learnable just as in the orthodox model where fiscal
policy simply balances the budget. If both policies are active, all equilibria are explosive.
In the monetarist equilibrium inflation and the output gap are stationary and only real bond
holdings explode. Our simulations indicate that in this case the all equilibria are unstable
under learning even if they are E-stable due to the presence of a non-stationary regressor.
19
Interest rate rules which depend on current values of the endogenous variables have
been criticised not be operational because policy makers usually lack information of real
time data. The following two subsections investigate whether these results are robust across
two prominent rules that have been proposed in response to this critique.
1.5.2. Forward Data Rules. Under a forward data rule the model with bonds can be
reduced to a system involving xt = (pˆit , zˆt , bˆt)′ (cf. appendix A.1.1). The system matrices
18Yet the transversality condition holds because β (β−1− γ1)< 1 as 0 < β < 1 and 0 < γ1 < β−1.
19As noted in section 1.3 E-stability implies learnability under certain regularity assumptions one of which
is that the solution is stationary.
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FIGURE 3. inflation, output gap and real bond holdings when both poli-
cies are active and agents have rational expectations (left panel) and are
learning (right panel)
are
A =
[
1 −κ 0
0 σy 0
β−1ϕpi β−1ϕz β−1− γ1
]
, B =
[
β 0 0
1−φpi σy−φz 0
β−1 0 1
]
. (66)
Explicit formulas for ϕpi and ϕz are reported in the appendix equation (A.9). For determi-
nacy we are interested in A−1B, which is given by 20
A−1B =
[
κσ−1y (1−φpi)+β κ(1−σ−1y φz) 0
σ−1y (1−φpi) 1−σ−1y φz 0
ψ1 ψ2 (β−1− γ1)−1
]
. (67)
Again for determinacy two roots of A−1B must be inside and one must be outside the unit
circle. The proposition below extends the determinacy results in the literature to the case
of interest rate rules with forward looking data.
20As in the case of a contemporaneous data rule ψ1 and ψ2 are compound parameters. Again the determi-
nacy conditions do not depend on them and so they are not reported.
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PROPOSITION 1.5.6. Under a forward data interest rate rule there is a determinate
rational expectations equilibrium if and only if either (Case I)
γ1 > β−1−1, (68)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1, (69)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy (70)
or (Case II)
γ1 < β−1−1 (71)
and in addition (Case IIa)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz < 1, (72)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy (73)
or (Case IIb):
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1, (74)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz > 2σy. (75)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
The first determinacy region (Case I) is the classical one where fiscal policy is passive
(68), monetary policy is active (69) and does not respond too aggressively to the output
gap (70) (cf. figure 4). The second one (Case IIa) is again similar to the results of Leeper
(1991). Active fiscal policy (71) combined with passive monetary policy (71) and – as in
the first region – a moderate reaction to the output gap (73) lead to determinacy. However,
under interest rate rules with forward data there is a third region of determinacy, where both
fiscal and monetary policy are active (71), (74) and monetary policy responds strongly to
the output gap (75).
For the analysis of E-stability the model is again transformed into a second order form
(23) with xt = (pˆit , zˆt , bˆt), α = 0, ϕ =
[
ρ 0
1 0
]
, ut = (gˆt , gˆt−1)′ and
Γ1 =
[
κσ−1y (1−φpi)+β κ(1−σ−1y φz) 0
σ−1y (1−φpi) 1−σ−1y φz 0
−κσ−1y β−1(1−φpi)−1 −κβ−1(1−σ−1y φz) 0
]
, Γ2 =
[
0 0 0
0 0 0
β−1ϕpi β−1ϕz β−1− γ1
]
. (76)
The conditions for E-stability depend again on the particular REE under consideration.
As with contemporaneous data based rules we concentrate on those REEs which are the
determinate solutions under the conditions identified in proposition (1.5.6). It can again
be shown numerically for the calibrated economy that any other REE of the form (24)
is E-unstable for all configurations of monetary and fiscal policy. The proposition below
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FIGURE 4. determinate (D), indeterminate (ID) and explosive (EX) region
under forward data rules
establishes that under forward data rules two fiscalist solutions and one monetarist solution
are candidates for a determinate equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1.5.7. Provided fiscal policy is passive (68) and (69)–(70) hold the
determinate solution is the monetarist solution (M) given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = Γ2 and c¯2, where
c¯2 is the unique solution to (31).
Provided fiscal policy is active (71) there are two fiscalist candidates for a determinate
solution, denoted (F1) and (F2). Under (72)–(73) the determinate solution is (F1) if φz >
σy and (F2) if φz < σy. Under (74)–(75) the determinate solution is (F1) if φz < σy and
(F2) if φz >σy. Both fiscalist solutions are of the general form c¯0 = 0, c¯1 =(ϕpiv,ϕyv,βλ3v)
and c¯2, where c¯2 is the unique solution to (31) and v is a column vector reported in appendix
A.1.4 equation (A.42).
PROOF. See appendix A.1.4. 
As in the case of contemporaneous data rules there is a unique monetarist solution (M),
which is a candidate for a determinate equilibrium under passive fiscal policy (68). Under
active fiscal policy (71) there are two fiscalist candidates (F1) and (F2) for a determinate
equilibrium. Which of these solutions is determinate depends on the conditions identified
in proposition 1.5.6 and additionally on whether φz ≶ σy. Again it is possible to derive the
conditions for E-stability of the monetarist solution analytically.
PROPOSITION 1.5.8. Under a forward data interest rate rule the monetarist solution is
E-stable if and only if
γ1 > β−1−1, (77)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1 (78)
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or
γ1 < β−1−1, (79)
κ(φpi −1)+ γ1βφz > σyγ1β
(
1− (β−1− γ1)−1
)
, (80)
κ(φpi −1)+φz > σy
(
β +1−2(β−1− γ1)−1
)
. (81)
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
In case of forward data rules proposition 1.5.8 shows that under passive fiscal policy
(77) monetary policy must be active (78) in order to assure E-stability of the monetarist
solution (cf. also figure 5) just as in the orthodox model where fiscal policy balances the
budget (cmp. proposition 1.4.5). Under active fiscal policy (79) the conditions for E-
stability of the monetarist solution are that (80)–(81) hold. As in case of contemporaneous
data rules only condition (80) is binding in the calibrated case depicted in figure 5. Another
parallel is that in the borderline case between active and passive fiscal policy γ1 = β−1−1
the condition simplifies to the requirement that monetary policy be active (78). In case of
the extremely active fiscal policy γ1 = 0 it simplifies to φpi > 1, which is the traditional
version of the Taylor principle.
The conditions for E-stability of the fiscalist solutions are again analytically intractable,
so we report only numerical results for the calibrated economy. As in case of contempora-
neous data rules the results the fiscalist equilibria are E-unstable if fiscal policy is passive.
Under active fiscal policy there is an E-stable fiscalist solution if the converse of condition
(80) holds. Depending on the magnitude of the feedback of the output gap on the nominal
interest rate φz, the E-stable solution is given by the fiscalist solution (F1) if φz > σy and
(F2) if φz < σy. As we noted above there is a third region of determinacy under forward
data rules, which we have labelled (Case IIb). In this region (the upper right region in figure
4, right panel) the fiscalist equilibrium (F2) is the unique stationary equilibrium, but it turns
out to be E-unstable. Instead it is either the other fiscalist solution (F1) or the monetarist
solution, which turn out to be E-stable if both policies are active. However, as in case of
contemporaneous data rules both types of equilibria are non-stationary. As in case of con-
temporaneous data rule we have conducted simulations for different parameterisations of
active monetary and fiscal policy. They indicate that as a consequence of the non-stationary
regressors both are unstable under learning in this parameter region, even though they are
E-stable. Summing up the results under forward data rules the conditions for determinacy
and learnability under passive fiscal policy are again the same as in the case without bonds
(section 1.4). The learnability conditions are also identical to the case of contemporaneous
data rules. However, in addition to the case of contemporaneous data rules the magnitude
of the feedback coefficient of the output gap on the nominal rate of interest φz is important
for uniqueness of the equilibrium. If fiscal policy is passive and monetary policy is active
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FIGURE 5. E-stability of the monetarist (M) and fiscalist solutions (F1,F2),
E-instability of all solutions (U) under forward data rules
then the monetarist solution is learnable . If in addition φz is sufficiently small, then it is
the determinate and also the unique learnable equilibrium. For large values of φz the equi-
librium is indeterminate and there may exist learnable sunspot equilibria. If fiscal policy is
active and monetary policy is passive then there is a learnable fiscalist solution. Again, if
φz is sufficiently small the fiscalist solution is the determinate and also the unique learnable
equilibrium. The equilibrium is indeterminate and unstable under learning if both policies
are passive. Finally, all equilibria are explosive and unstable under learning if both policies
are active. The main difference compared to contemporaneous data rules is that, indepen-
dent of what fiscal policy does, monetary policy should choose a coefficient φz which is not
too large to prevent the possibility of learnable sunspots.
1.5.3. Lagged Data Rules. The last type of interest rate rules which we consider are
lagged data rules Rˆt = φpi pˆit−1+φzzˆt−1. With xt = (Rˆt , pˆit , zˆt , bˆt)′ and
A =
 0 φpi φz 00 1 −κ 01 0 σy 0
β−1 −β−1 0 β−1− γ1
, B =
1 0 0 00 β 0 00 1 σy 0
0 0 0 1
, (82)
the model can be written in first order form (cf. appendix A.1.1). The relevant matrix to
investigate determinacy is
A−1B =

− σyφz+φpiκ 1+
φpiσyβ
φz+φpiκ σy 0
κ
φz+φpiκ
φzβ
φz+φpiκ 0 0
1
φz+φpiκ −
φpiβ
φz+φpiκ 0 0
ψ1 ψ2 − σy1−γ1β (β
−1− γ1)−1
. (83)
Noting that xt contains two jump variables and two predetermined variables and that the
system is block triangular it is straightforward to derive the conditions for determinacy.
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PROPOSITION 1.5.9. Under a lagged data interest rate rule there is a determinate
rational expectations equilibrium if only if (Case I)
γ1 > β−1−1 (84)
and either (Case Ia)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz > 1, (85)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy (86)
or (Case Ib)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz < 1, (87)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz > 2σy (88)
or (Case II)
γ1 < β−1−1, (89)
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φz < 1, (90)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φz < 2σy. (91)
PROOF. See appendix A.1.3. 
In case of lagged data rules there are three regions with a determinate equilibrium. Un-
der passive fiscal policy (84) one set of conditions is again that monetary policy is active
(85) and interest rates are not too sensitive to the output gap (86). Under active fiscal policy
(89) determinacy requires that monetary policy is passive (90) and does not react too much
to the output gap (91). So far the conditions for determinacy are the same as under forward
data rules. However under lagged data rules there is a second determinacy region under
passive fiscal policy (84) where monetary policy is passive (87) and the sensitivity of in-
terest rates with respect to changes in the output gap is not too small (88). The determinate
regions for the calibrated model are depicted in figure 6.
Again we derive a second order form to analyse E-stability. It is given by (23) with
xt = (pˆit , zˆt , Rˆt , bˆt), α = 0, ϕ = ρ , ut = gˆt and
Γ1 =
 β +κσ
−1
y κ 0 0
σ−1y 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
−1−β−1κσ−1y −β−1κ 0 0
, Γ2 =
 −κφpiσ
−1
y −κφzσ−1y 0 0
−φpiσ−1y −φzσ−1y 0 0
φpi φz 0 0
β−1κφpiσ−1y β−1κφzσ−1y β−1 β−1− γ1
.
(92)
In case of lagged data rules the reduced form of the model is four dimensional and therefore
it is not possible to solve for the REEs analytically. Therefore we will restrict the analysis
of E-stability to the cases where there is a determinate solution, which can be computed
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FIGURE 6. determinacy and E-stability under lagged data rules (determi-
nacy (D), indeterminacy (ID), explosiveness (EX); E-stability of a mone-
tarist (M) or fiscalist (F) solution; E-instability (U))
numerically. Figure 6 depicts the results for the calibrated model. It turns out that the
determinate region where both policies are passive is not E-stable, whereas the regions
where one of the policies is active and the other one is passive are both E-stable. It is
interesting to note that the regions where there is a determinate and E-stable solution are
the same as under forward data rules.
1.6. Conclusions
We have investigated the consequences of policy interaction for determinacy and learn-
ability in a standard New Keynesian model. Following McCallum (2001) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2004) we have grouped the different solutions in monetarist and fiscalist so-
lutions. As one may have expected the results differ fundamentally when monetary and
fiscal policy are active or passive.
Consider first the case of passive fiscal policy. By definition the conditions for determi-
nacy under passive fiscal policy are the same as in a model where fiscal policy is ignored
(as e.g. in Bullard and Mitra, 2002). The solutions identified by Bullard and Mitra (2002)
correspond to the monetarist solutions in the model with a fiscal policy rule. Under pas-
sive fiscal policy the conditions for E-stability of the monetarist solutions continue to be
the same as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). Notably they are independent of the fiscal policy
rule. Across all the three types of interest rate rules there is a unique learnable monetarist
equilibrium if monetary policy is active and the nominal interest rate is not too sensitive to
changes in the output gap. If on the other hand monetary policy is passive then there is no
learnable equilibrium. Under passive fiscal policy the fiscalist solutions are all E-unstable.
As mentioned in the introduction there is a dispute in the literature about the plausibil-
ity of the predictions of the fiscal theory of the price level under active fiscal policy. The
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FTPL has been criticised on various grounds (cf. e.g. Buiter, 2002) and recently the in-
stability under learning has been brought forward against the FTPL by McCallum (2001).
Evans and Honkapohja (2004) find that, while fiscalist equilibria are not learnable in the
model of McCallum (2001), they may indeed be learnable for certain monetary and fis-
cal policies in a model similar to the one of Leeper (1991). The New Keynesian model
has probably become the most popular model in the analysis of monetary policy. We find
significant support for the predictions made by the FTPL in a New Keynesian framework.
In the primary case dealt with in the literature on the FTPL, where fiscal policy is active
and monetary policy is passive there is a learnable fiscalist equilibrium for a large range of
parameterisations of the policy rules. Especially there is a unique learnable fiscalist equi-
librium if the nominal interest rate should not vary too much with the output gap, the same
condition which guarantees a unique learnable monetarist equilibrium under passive fiscal
and active monetary policy. This result is robust across various popular specifications of
the interest rate rule. The orthodox monetarist solutions are found to be E-unstable under
passive monetary policy.
Finally, all solutions are explosive in a regime where both policies are active. This
is important for the analysis of learnability because E-stability guarantees convergence of
least squares learning only if the equilibrium that is being learned is stationary. There are no
analytical results for the convergence of learning to explosive equilibria, but the simulations
we have conducted suggest that neither equilibrium is learnable under this policy regime.
Contrary to a conjecture by McCallum (2001) the theory of adaptive learning shows a
reasonable way how – under active fiscal and passive policy – agents may coordinate on a an
equilibrium in which fiscal variables influence the evolution of the price level as predicted
by the FTPL. Yet there is still a unique learnable monetarist equilibrium if monetary policy
is active and fiscal policy is passive. If both policies are either passive or active then there
is no learnable equilibrium. These results suggest that the coordination of monetary and
fiscal policy is an important ingredient to achieve a unique learnable equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 2
Convergence of Least Squares and E-Stability in Models with Sunspots
2.1. Introduction
Adaptive learning has become increasingly popular over the last two decades. The
concept of E-stability has been shown to yield the conditions for learnability of funda-
mental equilibria in various models. Recently a growing literature on the learnability of
non-fundamental equilibria has emerged. The relevance of non-fundamental equilibria for
economic analysis is a contentious issue because the concept of rational expectations equi-
libria (REE) does not reveal how the coordination on a particular equilibrium takes places.
Least squares learning is a widely applied adaptive learning algorithm, which shows how
the coordination can take place and which can be used as an equilibrium selection de-
vice. In case of fundamental equilibria it has been shown that E-stability is equivalent to
convergence of least squares learning to an REE (cf. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). For
non-fundamental equilibria a connection between the convergence of learning algorithms
like recursive least squares (RLS) and E-stability remains to be proven. Yet there is a grow-
ing literature on the learnability of sunspot equilibria that focuses entirely on E-stability.
Prominent examples are Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005)
who investigate E-stability of sunspot equilibria in models of monetary policy. Indeed both
papers only check certain conditions, which are conjectured to be necessary and sufficient
for E-stability, but so far this has not been proven either.
The main contributions of this chapter are that we present new results on E-stability
and the convergence of least squares, which have not been established before for sunspot
equilibria. For common factor representations we give necessary and sufficient conditions
for E-stability. We also show that general form representations are always E-unstable in
models purely forward looking models. This result is likely to extend to any model with
a sufficiently low degree of inertia. Apart from giving necessary and sufficient conditions
for E-stability we also establish that the convergence of least squares learning (augmented
with projection facilities) is governed by the stability of the mean ODE. We conjecture that
E-stability of a set of sunspot representations is equivalent to stability of the mean ODE
analogous to the results for fundamental equilibria. However, we have not yet been able to
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prove this formally. For common factor representations we present evidence from a simu-
lation study that indeed stability under least squares learning E-stability are equivalent.1
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets up a multivariate self-
referential linear model and defines a rational expectations equilibrium, an equilibrium
representation and E-stability. The central part of the section are two theorems, one that
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for E-stability of common factor representations
and another one which proves that general form representations are always E-unstable in
purely forward looking models. In a purely forward looking model common factor repre-
sentations are E-stable provided the MSV representation is E-stable. Section 2.3 establishes
that under standard regularity conditions recursive least squares (RLS) converges locally to
an REE provided the mean ODE is locally stable. We present a convergence result that uses
projection facilities to assure that the learning algorithm is well behaved.2 The convergence
proof is based on a general convergence theorem by Delyon (1996). Section 2.4 applies
the results to a standard New Keynesian model where interest rates are set via a forward
looking Taylor rule. Evans and McGough (2005) claim that there are E-stable common
factor sunspot representations. As mentioned above all results in the literature are based
on the conjecture that the conditions for E-stability are analogous to those for fundamental
equilibria. We can apply our results on E-stability of common factor representations from
section 2.2 which confirm that this conjecture is indeed correct. In section 2.4 we present
some simulation results which show convergence of RLS to a common factor sunspot rep-
resentation even without imposition of a projection facility. On the other hand a failure of
E-stability leads to rapid divergence of the beliefs. These results show that the equivalence
of E-stability and convergence of least squares learning, which has been established for
fundamental equilibria, seems to carry over to the case of non-fundamental equilibria. An-
other interesting outcome of the simulations is that under a constant gain version of least
squares learning there may be large fluctuations in the beliefs of the agents about the im-
pact of the sunspot on the economy. In contrast to the results under RLS the constant gain
algorithm does not settle down on a particular equilibrium. It rather wanders around in the
continuum of sunspot representations, so under learning there may be times with a large
and other times with a small impact of sunspots on the economy.
1Our instability result explains why general form representations have been found to be E-unstable for
reasonable parameter values in all models we are aware of. The lack of E-stable representations renders the
study of a connection between E-stability and converges of RLS impossible in case of general form represen-
tations. Therefore, in our simulation study, we restrict our attention to common factor representations.
2The projections are generally needed to assure that the estimates remain in a compact set and that the
learning algorithm converges. For details confer section 2.3.
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2.2. A Multivariate Linear Model
Consider the multivariate linear model
yn = α+βE∗n yn+1+δyn−1+κwn, (93)
wn = ρwn−1+ϑn, (94)
where ϑn is white noise and the roots of ρ are inside the unit circle. The symbol E∗ de-
notes the expectation operator. The star is meant to indicate that expectations need not be
rational. Assume that at time n the information set is given by In = {yk−1,wk,εk; k ≤ n},
where εn is an arbitrary martingale difference sequence. So all endogenous and exogenous
variables are observable, but the information set in period n excludes the current endoge-
nous variables. Under rational expectations this information set is equivalent to the one
which includes current endogenous variables, because the current endogenous variables yn
can be inferred from the model (93)–(94) given In. Under learning the equivalence breaks
down. The standard approach in the learning literature is to assume that current endoge-
nous variables realise after the agents have formed their expectations about yn+1 and thus
not to include them in the information set of the agents in period n.
DEFINITION 2.2.1. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a stochastic process
yn that solves the expectational difference equation (93)–(94) with E∗n = En, where En
denotes the conditional expectation operator as of time n.
DEFINITION 2.2.2. A rational expectations equilibrium representation (REER) is an
explicit difference equation any solution to which is a rational expectations equilibrium.
An REER is a recursive representation of an REE without a reference to expectations.
In the learning literature it is usually computed using the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients. An REE may have multiple recursive representations. The minimal state variable
(MSV) representation has become the standard representation for regular REEs (cf. Mc-
Callum, 1983).
DEFINITION 2.2.3. A minimal state variable representation (MSV representation) of
the model (93)–(94) is an REER of the type
yn = a+byn−1+ cwn, (95)
with b = 0 if δ = 0.
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Definition 2.2.3 is the standard definition used in the learning literature. In a model with
lags (δ 6= 0) there may be multiple representations of this form.3 In the presence of sunspots
there are two prominent types of representations for the same REE. The learnability of an
REE depends on the particular representation of the equilibrium. Therefore it is important
to distinguish between the two concepts in the analysis of learnability.
DEFINITION 2.2.4. Let εn is an arbitrary martingale difference sequence. A general
form representation of the model (93)–(94) is an REER of the type
yn = a+byn−1+hyn−2+ cwn+ f wn−1+ eεn, (96)
with h = 0 and f = 0 if δ=0.
Note that the coefficients of an REER have to meet certain conditions, which will be
laid out below. So not every process of the functional form (96) is a general form represen-
tation. General form representations have often been found to be unstable under learning.
However, ‘every sunspot equilibrium has a common factor representation, and the stability
properties of common factor representations are different from their general form counter-
parts’ (Evans and McGough, 2005).
DEFINITION 2.2.5. Let εn is an arbitrary martingale difference sequence. A common
factor representation of the model (93)–(94) is an REER of the type
yn = a+byn−1+ cwn+dζn, (97)
ζn = ϕζn−1+ εn (98)
with b = 0 if δ = 0.
In case of indeterminacy of order k, ζn is a k dimensional vector of sunspots and ϕ
is a k dimensional diagonal matrix, with the stable characteristic roots of the model on the
diagonal (cf. Evans and McGough, 2005). Therefore ζn is often called a resonant frequency
sunspot. Compared to general form representations, common factor representations have
more often been found to be E-stable. The fact that general form representations include
additional lags of the endogenous variables as compared to common factor representations
seems to be destabilising under learning. The additional lags are also the driving force of
the instability result for general form representations, which we will present below.
3Learnability is a criterion to chose among multiple REERs. Therefore the literature on adaptive learning
usually does not use the selection criterion proposed by McCallum (1983) to choose a particular REER. Espe-
cially all REERs of the form (95) are labelled MSV representation and not only those selected by McCallum’s
subsidiary principle.
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Because of its relative simplicity assume first that the perceived law of motion (PLM) of
the agents is of the same functional form as a common factor representation (97).4 Recall
that the current endogenous variables yn are not included in the information set In and
assume that ρ is known. Then the forecasts at time n are
E∗n yn+1 = a+bE
∗
n yn+ cE
∗
n wn+1+dE
∗
nζn+1
= a+b(a+byn−1+ cwn+dζn)+ cρwn+dϕζn
= (I+b)a+b2yn−1+(bc+ cρ)wn+(bd+dϕ)ζn.
The star indicates that during the learning process the PLM of the agents will not be equal to
an REER and as a consequence their forecasts E∗n yn+1 will deviate from rational forecasts.
5
If the REER is learnable, then the error made by the agents will vanish eventually. Inserting
these expectations in (93) and collecting coefficients yields the T-map
a → Ta(a,b) = α+β (I+b)a, (99)
b → Tb(b) = βb2+δ , (100)
c → Tc(b,c) = β (bc+ cρ)+κ, (101)
d → Td(b,d) = β (bd+dϕ). (102)
If the PLM is of the general form (96) and assuming ρ is known the agents’ forecasts are
E∗n yn+1 = a+bE
∗
n yn+hyn−1+ cE
∗
n wn+1+ f wn
= a+b(a+byn−1+hyn−2+ cwn+ f wn−1+ eεn)+hyn−1+ cρwn+ f wn
= (I+b)a+(b2+h)yn−1+bhyn−2+(bc+ cρ+ f )wn+b f wn−1+beεn.
Again, inserting these expectations in (93) yields the T-map given by equation (99) together
with
(b,h) → T(b,h)(b,h) = (β (b2+h)+δ ,βbh), (103)
c → Tc(b,c, f ) = β (bc+ cρ+ f )+κ, (104)
f → Tf (b, f ) = βb f , (105)
e → Te(b,e) = βbe. (106)
In case the perceived law of motion is of the same functional form as a common factor
representations define ξ ′ = (a,b,c,d) and z′n = (1,y′n−1,w
′
n,ζ ′n). If it is of the general form
4That is the PLM is an arbitrary process of the form (96). Especially all coefficients are unrestricted
matrices.
5The literature on adaptive learning generally assumes that the agents ignore the uncertainty of the coef-
ficients during the learning process, when they make their forecasts.
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let ξ ′ = (a,b,h,c, f ,e) and z′n = (1,y′n−1,y
′
n−2,w
′
n,w
′
n−1,ε
′
n). With these definitions we can
write the perceived law of motion in the simple form
yn = ξ ′zn. (107)
The counterpart of the perceived law of motion (PLM) is the actual law of motion (ALM).
The PLM is the forecasting model of the agents and the ALM is the resulting data gen-
erating process for the economy, when the PLM is substituted in the model (93)–(94).
The coefficients of the ALM are given by the T-map. In case of a PLM of the common
factor type let T (ξ ) = (Ta(a,b),Tb(b),Tc(b,c),Td(b,d)), where for all v ∈ {a,b,c,d} the
mappings Tv(·) are defined by (99)–(102). In case of a PLM of the general form define
the T-map analogously with the components Tv(·), v ∈ {a,(b,h),c, f ,e} given by (99) and
(103)–(106). Then the actual law of motion (ALM) is
yn = T (ξ )′zn. (108)
The T-map ξ → T (ξ ) is a convenient representation of the results of the method of unde-
termined coefficients. A fixed point ξ¯ = T (ξ¯ ) of this mapping yields the coefficients ξ¯ of
the corresponding REER yn = ξ¯ ′zn. The following proposition collects these results.
PROPOSITION 2.2.6. A common factor representation is a difference equation of the
form (97), where the coefficients (a,b,c,d) are a fixed point of the T-map given by (99)–
(102). A general form representation is a difference equation of the form (96), where the
coefficients (a,b,h,c, f ,e) are a fixed point of the T-map given by (99) and (103)–(106).
Apart from its importance for the computation of an REER the T-map plays a promi-
nent role in the literature on adaptive learning. Across many different models it has turned
out that the T-map determines the conditions for learnability of an REER under various
learning algorithms, especially RLS. The central property of the T-map in this respect is
expectational stability (E-stability). In case of a locally determinate equilibrium E-stability
is usually defined as local asymptotic stability of the REER ξ¯ under the differential equa-
tion
ξ˙ = T (ξ )−ξ (109)
where the T-map maps the coefficients of the perceived law of motion of the agents into
those of the actual law of motion. By definition the REER ξ¯ is a fixed point of the T-
map and thus also a rest point of the ODE (109). Under certain regularity conditions
E-stability guarantees that least squares learning converges locally to ξ¯ . 6 This definition
of E-stability is no longer useful if the REER is not locally unique as it is the case for a
sunspot representation. In general there will a continuum of common factor or general form
representations ξ¯ . In case of indeterminacy there is a continuum of sunspot representations
6The regularity conditions will be introduced in section 2.3.
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and we cannot expect convergence to a particular equilibrium. A suitable extension of the
concept of learnability is to ask whether convergence occurs to some point in the set of
sunspot representations Ξ for all initial conditions in a neighbourhood of the set.
DEFINITION 2.2.7. Let Ξ be a set of common factor or general form representations of
the model (93)–(94). Then Ξ is E-stable if it is a locally asymptotically stable set in the
sense of Lyapunov for equation (109), where the T-map is the same as in proposition 2.2.6.
Definition 2.2.7 is based on the definition by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) p.245.7 It
generalises the definition of E-stability of an MSV representation by not requiring conver-
gence to a particular equilibrium point ξ¯ but only to a set of equilibrium points Ξ.8 We will
now apply this concept to both common factor and general form representations.
Consider first the case of common factor representations. Generically there are
(2k
k
)
isolated solutions for b¯, where k is the number of endogenous variables (i.e. the dimension
of yn). Let Ξb¯ = {ξ |T (ξ ) = ξ ∧b= b¯} be the set of REERs corresponding to one particular
solution to equation (100). In the absence of sunspots Ξb¯ contains a single REER. This is
because generically a and c are uniquely determined by (99) and (101) given b¯. Moreover
absence of sunspots means that d¯ = 0 yielding a unique REER ξ¯ of the MSV type. How-
ever, if sunspots exist then there will be a continuum of solutions for d¯. In this case Ξb¯
is a non-trivial set of REERs. Before we present the conditions for E-stability define the
following derivatives
DTa(b¯) = β (I+ b¯), (110)
DTb(b¯) = b¯′⊗β + I⊗β b¯, (111)
DTc(b¯) = ρ ′⊗β + I⊗β b¯, (112)
DTd(b¯) = ϕ⊗β + I⊗β b¯, (113)
where for all v ∈ {a,b,c, f}, DTv = ∂vec Tv/∂ (vec v)′ is the Jacobian of vec Tv.
PROPOSITION 2.2.8. Assume that the information set at time n is In = {1,yn−1,wn,εn}.
Let m= dim({x|(DTd(b¯)− I)x= 0}). A necessary condition for E-stability of a set of com-
mon factor representations Ξb¯ is that none of the eigenvalues of DTa(b¯), DTb(b¯), DTc(b¯)
and DTd(b¯) has a real part larger than 1. This condition is also sufficient if apart from m
eigenvalues of DTd(b¯) equal to 1 the eigenvalues of DTa(b¯), DTb(b¯), DTc(b¯) and DTd(b¯)
have real parts different from 1.
7A formal definition of local asymptotic stability in the sense of Lyapunov is given in the appendix (cf.
definition A.2.1).
8In our simulations in section 2.4 we will see that the particular point of convergence depends both on
the initial beliefs ξ0 and on the shocks that hit the economy.
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PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
Proposition 2.2.8 is the main proposition of this section. Lets make the regularity as-
sumption that apart from m eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the T-map equal to one, there are
no further eigenvalues equal to one. Then proposition 2.2.8 states that the set of REERs
Ξb¯ is E-stable if and only if all remaining eigenvalues have real parts smaller than one.
The conditions on the matrices (110)–(113) are well known in the literature. However,
due to the zero eigenvalues in DTd(b¯) standard stability results are not applicable and to
our knowledge this is the first time that it is proven that they are indeed necessary and
sufficient for E-stability.
Inspection of the T-map for common factor representations (equations 99–102) shows
that the components Ta(·), Tb(·) and Tc(·) are independent of the sunspot multiplier d. Thus
a fixed point (a¯, b¯, c¯) yields an MSV representation. Put differently, a common factor repre-
sentation with d¯ = 0 is an MSV representation. Therefore a common factor representation
is E-stable if the corresponding MSV representation (the one with the same b¯) is E-stable
and none of the eigenvalues of DTd(b¯) has a real part larger than 1. The condition on the
eigenvalues of DTd(b¯) does not seem to be very restrictive in applications, which explains
why common factor representations are often found to be E-stable, whenever the MSV so-
lution is E-stable. For the special case of purely forward looking models we have the even
stronger result that E-stability of the set of common factor representations and the MSV
representation are equivalent.
COROLLARY 2.2.9. Assume that the model is purely forward looking (δ = 0) and that
sunspots exist. Then E-stability of the MSV representation is equivalent to E-stability of
the set of common factor sunspot representations. The necessary and sufficient condition
is that all eigenvalues of β have real parts smaller than 1.
In a purely forward looking model DTd(b¯) = ϕ ⊗β . The result now follows because
the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product are equal to the products of the eigenvalues of the
matrices and the eigenvalues of ϕ are by construction stable eigenvalues of the model.9 A
prominent application of this framework to monetary policy is the New Keynesian model
with a forward looking interest rate rule (cf. e.g. Evans and McGough, 2005). We will
review this framework in section 2.4. Corollary 2.2.9 is a bit more general than it seems at
first sight. The eigenvalues of a matrix are continuous functions of the parameters of the
model. It follows immediately that corollary 2.2.9 extends to all models with a sufficiently
low degree of inertia.
9See Evans and McGough (2005) for details concerning the computation of general form representations.
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In case of general form representations define the set Ξ(b¯,h¯) = {ξ |T (ξ ) = ξ ∧ (b,h) =
(b¯, h¯)}, where (b¯, h¯) is a particular solution to (103). As in case of common factor repre-
sentations Ξ(b¯,h¯) may contain a single REER or a continuum of REERs. The derivatives of
the T-map are (110) and (112) as well as
DT(b,h)(b¯, h¯) =
[
b¯′⊗β + I⊗β b¯ I⊗β
h¯′⊗β I⊗β b¯
]
, (114)
DTf (b¯) = I⊗β b¯, (115)
DTe(b¯) = β b¯. (116)
We conjecture that the analogous proposition to (2.2.8) holds, i.e. a necessary condition for
E-stability of the set of general form representations Ξ(b¯,h¯) is that none of the eigenvalues
of DTa(b¯), DT(b,h)(b¯, h¯), DTc(b¯) and DTe(b¯) has a real part larger than 1. We presume
that this condition is also sufficient if apart from m eigenvalues of DTe(b¯) equal to 1 the
eigenvalues of DTa(b¯), DT(b,h)(b¯, h¯), DTc(b¯) and DTe(b¯) have real parts different from 1,
where m= dim({x|(DTe(b¯)− I)x= 0}). Currently our results are limited to purely forward
looking models. In case of a purely forward looking model the T-map simplifies to (99),
(100), (101) and (106). As in case of common factor representations let Ξb¯ = {ξ |T (ξ ) =
ξ ∧b = b¯} be the set of REERs corresponding to one particular solution to (100). Now the
following proposition is an immediate consequence of proposition 2.2.8.
PROPOSITION 2.2.10. Assume that the information set at time n is In = {1,yn−1,wn,εn}
and that the model is purely forward looking (δ = 0). A necessary condition for E-stability
of a set of general form representations Ξb¯ is that none of the eigenvalues of DTa(b¯),
DTb(b¯), DTc(b¯) and DTe(b¯) has a real part larger than 1.
PROOF. Immediate from proposition 2.2.8. 
Note that the previous proposition does not give sufficient conditions for E-stability.
The following proposition shows that general form representations cannot be E-stable in a
purely forward looking model.
PROPOSITION 2.2.11. Assume that the information set at time n is In = {1,yn−1,wn,εn}
and that the model is purely forward looking (δ = 0). Then all general form representations
with b¯ 6= 0 are E-unstable.
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
The qualification b¯ 6= 0 is necessary, because there is a unique general form represen-
tation with b¯ = 0, which is identical to the MSV representation. As noted above the MSV
representations are nested in the functional form of both common factor and general form
representations. However, all proper sunspot representations (i.e. those with b¯ 6= 0) of the
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general form are always E-unstable. We conjecture that this instability result also holds for
all models with a sufficiently low degree of inertia.10 Corollary 2.2.9 and proposition 2.2.11
show that common factor representations are E-stable whenever the MSV representation is
E-stable whereas general form representations are always E-unstable. As we have argued
above both results extend to models with a sufficiently low degree of inertia. This finding
rationalises why common factor representations have often been found to be E-stable in the
literature in contrast to their counterparts of the general form.
2.3. Convergence of RLS
The previous section has focused exclusively on the stability of the differential equation
(109). Due to its importance for the convergence of RLS it has been labelled E-stability
(cf. definition 2.2.7). The ODE (109) has been shown to be a good approximation for
the average asymptotic behaviour of least squares learning in case of regular REE (cf. e.g.
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). The main technical difficulty in proving convergence in
the presence of sunspots is that there is an unbounded continuum of equilibria. All known
convergence results require boundedness of the sequence of estimates. We will assume that
the estimates of the agents are projected on some compact set, which contains a non-empty
set of sunspot equilibria and ask wether convergence occurs to some equilibrium within
this set. Of course such a procedure does exclude equilibria that are far away from the
initial beliefs of the agents. However our simulations in section 2.4 indicate that conver-
gence generally occurs to an equilibrium point close to the initial beliefs of the agents even
without imposition of a projection facility.
The second part of the problem is that there is a continuum of equilibria instead of an
isolated equilibrium. We apply the results of Delyon (1996), which extend earlier results of
Metivier and Priouret (1984) and Benveniste et al. (1990) to cover continua of equilibria.
2.3.1. A Convergence Theorem for Recursive Stochastic Algorithms. We consider
recursive stochastic algorithms of the form
θn = pi
(
θn−1+ γnψn
(
H(θn−1,Xn)+ γnρn(θn−1,Xn)
))
, (117)
where θn ∈Rk is a vector of parameters, Xn ∈Rl is a vector of state variables, γn is a scalar
sequence, H :Rk×Rl →Rk and ρn :Rk×Rl →Rk are both functions of the parameters
and the states and pi and ψn are projections. The projection pi is in general necessary to
assure that the parameters θn remain in some compact set Q⊂Rk, whereas the projections
10This remark is based on the assumption that an unstable root in (114) leads to E-instability of general
form representations in models with inertia. However, as we have remarked above it remains to be proven
that this condition is necessary for E-stability of general form representations.
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ψn guarantee that |θn− θn−1| → 0. We need the following assumptions on the stochastic
algorithm (117)
(A1) γn ≥ 0, ∑γn = ∞, ∑γ2n < ∞, and ∑ |γn− γn+1|< ∞,
(A2) there exist C1, C2, p1, p2 such that for all θ ∈ Q, x ∈Rl
|H(θ ,x)| ≤ C1(1+ |x|p1),
|ρn(θ ,x)| ≤ C2(1+ |x|p2),
(A3) H(θ ,x) is twice continuously differentiable with bounded second derivatives on
Q,
(A4) for some C > 0 and η < 1 let Bn = {θ ∈ Rk| |θ | < Cγ−ηn } then for all n, θ :
ψn(θ) ∈ Bn and ψn(θ) = θ if θ ∈ Bn.
Assumption (A1) guarantees that the gain sequence decreases fast enough to obtain conver-
gence but not too fast, so that convergence to a non-equilibrium point can be excluded. It is
readily satisfied for γn = 1/n. (A2) and (A3) are regularity assumptions on the functions H
and ρn. As mentioned above the projections ψn guarantee that |θn−θn−1| → 0. We assume
that the dynamics of the state vector follows a conditionally linear process
Xn = A(θn−1)Xn−1+B(θn−1)Wn, (118)
which satisfies the set of assumptions (B).
(B1) Wn is iid with finite absolute moments,
(B2) there exist constants K1, K2, K3 and 0 < ω < 1 such that for all θ ∈ Q, all n≥ 0
|A(θ)| ≤ K1 |A(θ)n|< K2ωn, |B(θ)| ≤ K3
for some matrix norm | · |, and A(θ) and B(θ) satisfy Lipschitz conditions on Q
with the constants K4 and K5.
Assumption (B2) is satisfied if the system matrices are continuously differentiable func-
tions of θ and the state process is asymptotically stationary. Under assumptions (B1) and
(B2), the state vector Xn converges in Lq for all q > 0 to the random variable 11
X∞(θ) =
∞
∑
k=1
Ak(θ)B(θ)Wk.
The central idea behind the convergence of the recursive stochastic algorithm can be seen
most easily ignoring the projections and rewriting (117) as 12
θn−θn−1
γn
= H(θn−1,Xn)+ γnρn(θn−1,Xn) (119)
11For a proof cf. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) p.129.
12Examples for recursive stochastic algorithms are recursive least squares and stochastic gradient learning.
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For n large enough ρn is negligible. As γn goes to zero the left hand side is well ap-
proximated by the differential of θ , whereas the right hand side can be approximated by
h(θ) = E[H(θ ,X∞(θ))], where θ is kept fixed and the expectation is taken with respect to
the distribution of X∞(θ) given by (2.3.1). This reasoning leads to the interest in the study
of the mean ODE or mean dynamics, which is the differential equation
θ˙ = h(θ). (120)
As shown by Evans and Honkapohja (1998) h(θ) is well defined and locally Lipschitz
under assumptions (A1-2) and (B1-2). The name mean dynamics derives from the fact
that it describes the average asymptotic behaviour of the recursive stochastic algorithm
(117). As we will see below the recursive stochastic algorithm converges locally to a set
of equilibrium points of the mean ODE provided the set is locally asymptotically stable.
Before we present the convergence proof we need two more assumptions.
(Proj) Q is a bounded set, pi is a Lipschitz continuous function such that pi(θ) ∈ Q for
all θ and pi(θ) = θ if θ ∈ Q. There exists a neighbourhood O of Q such that for
some δ > 0
〈∇V (θ),pi(θ)−θ〉<−δ |pi(θ)−θ |, for x ∈ O\Q, (121)
where V is the Lyapunov function in (Stab),
(Stab) there exists a non-negative C1 function V and a set of stationary points Θ ⊂ O
closed with respect to O (the same as in (Proj)) such that
• h is continuous, and 〈∇V (θ),h(θ)〉< 0 if θ ∈ O\Θ,
• V (θ) is constant on any connected subset of Θ.
Assumption (Proj) guarantees that θn remains within a compact set Q and that there are no
additional rest points of the mean dynamics at the boundary of Q that are introduced by
the projection (condition 121). The stability condition (Stab) postulates that Θ is a locally
asymptotically stable set of equilibrium points of the mean dynamics.13 We are now able
to prove the following convergence result.
PROPOSITION 2.3.1. Let θn be given by algorithm (117). Assume that the state Xn
follows the conditionally linear process (118) and that (A), (B), (Proj) and (Stab) hold.
Then θn converges a.s. to Θ. Furthermore Xn is bounded in Lq for all q > 0 and the
projections ψn are made only a finite number of times.
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
13Wilson (1969) and Lin et al. (1996) prove the existence of such a Lyapunov function V provided the set
Θ is asymptotically stable.
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REMARK 2.3.2. The projections ψn are not necessary if the state dynamics (118) is
independent of θ .
Probably the projections ψn are not necessary at all, however the proof without these
projections requires significantly more technical details (cf. Benveniste et al., 1990, chapter
3). The assumption of the projection facility pi (Proj) is wide spread in the literature (cf.
e.g. Marcet and Sargent, 1989b). It has been criticised because it is hardly verifiable in
applications.14 As a consequence convergence results that do not require the projection pi
have been developed (cf. e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 1998). Without assumption (Proj)
it is generally not possible to obtain convergence with probability one. Yet, for large n,
the gain γn becomes very small and the probability of convergence approaches one. We
conjecture that it is also possible to derive such a result for the convergence to sunspot
equilibria, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.3.2. Application to Least Squares Learning. We will now apply proposition 2.3.1
to least squares learning of common factor representations. The application to general form
representations is completely analogous. Under real time learning the agents update their
beliefs about the coefficients ξn of the perceived law of motion
yn = ξ ′nzn (122)
every period given the latest available information In = {yk−1,wk,εk; k≤ n}. Recall that for
a common factor representation ξ ′n = (an,bn,cn,dn) and z′n = (1,y′n−1,w
′
n,ζ ′n). Given the
current beliefs ξn of the agents the actual law of motion of the economy evolves according
to
yn = T (ξn)′zn, (123)
where T (ξ ) = (Ta(a,b),Tb(b),Tc(b,c),Td(b,d)) and the mappings Tv(·) are given by (99)–
(102). We assume that the learning algorithm of the agents is given by the following
recursive stochastic algorithm
θn = pi
(
θn−1+
1
n
ψn
(
vec(R−1n−1zn−1z
′
n−1(T (ξn−1)−ξn−1))
n/(n+1)vec(znz′n−Rn−1)
))
, (124)
where θn = vec(ξn,Rn) and the projections pi and ψn satisfy assumptions (Proj) and (A4)
respectively. This learning algorithm is a least squares algorithm augmented with two
projections pi and ψn. If pi(θ) = θ and ψn(θ) = θ for all n, θ , then (124) is identical to
14In general it is not possible to obtain the explicit functional form of the Lyapunov function V and in
these cases it is not possible to verify that condition (121) holds for a given set Q. If condition (121) fails and
the remaining conditions in proposition 2.3.1 are all satisfied then θn converges either to Θ or to the boundary
of the set Q.
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recursive least squares and given appropriate initial conditions, ξn equals the OLS estimator
while Rn is the corresponding moment matrix15
ξn =
(
n−1
∑
i=0
ziz′i
)−1 n−1
∑
i=0
ziy′i and Rn =
1
n
n
∑
i=0
ziz′i. (125)
In general our convergence proof will require that the projections are not simply identi-
ties.16 Yet, as we will see in section 2.4, our simulation results suggest that in the New Key-
nesian model convergence obtains even without imposition of a projection facility for initial
conditions in a neighbourhood of the set of common factor representations. The learning
algorithm (124) is a function of the state variables X ′n = (1,y′n−1,w
′
n,ζ ′n,y′n−2,w
′
n−1,ζ
′
n−1),
which follow the conditionally linear Markov process
Xn =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ta(an−1,bn−1) Tb(bn−1) Tc(bn−1,cn−1) Td(bn−1,dn−1) 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ϕ 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 0 0 0

Xn−1+

1
0
ϑn
εn
0
0
0

. (126)
Conditional on ξn−1 the process (126) is a Markov representation of the actual law of
motion of the economy under learning. Together equations (124) and (126) give a complete
characterisation of the model (93)–(94) under learning. Before we state the convergence
result define Θb¯ = {θ = vec(ξ ,R)|ξ ∈ Ξb¯∧R = M¯(ξ )}, where M¯(ξ ) = E[zn(ξ )zn(ξ )′].17
Recall that Ξb¯ is the set of common factor representations given one particular b¯ (cf. section
2.2). Consider a θ = vec(ξ ,R) ∈ Θb¯. The ξ -component of θ corresponds to a particular
common factor representation, while the R-component is the expected value of the moment
matrix of the regressors zn conditional on ξ . Now we can apply proposition 2.3.1 to prove
the convergence of least squares learning.
PROPOSITION 2.3.3. Consider the learning algorithm (124) and the state dynamics
(126). Assume that the projections pi and ψn satisfy assumptions (Proj) and (A4) respec-
tively. Assume that Θb¯ is a locally asymptotically stable set of the mean ODE (120). Let Q
(the same as in (Proj)) be a compact set such that
(1) Q∩Θb¯ 6= /0,
15Note that ξn includes only information up to period n−1, because yn is not included in the information
set In (for a discussion of this assumption cf. section 2.2).
16The projections are discussed in detail in the previous paragraph.
17The expectation is taken with respect to the unique stationary measure of the Markov process (126)
holding ξ constant.
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(2) the inverse of R is well defined,
(3) the roots of Tb(b) are inside the unit circle,
(4) Q is a subset of the domain of attraction of Θb¯,
then θn converges to Θb¯ a.s. and the projections ψn are made only a finite number of times.
PROOF. See appendix A.2. 
Proposition 2.3.3 is the main proposition of this section. It states that the learning
algorithm converges almost surely to the set Θb¯ if it is locally asymptotically stable with
respect to the mean ODE θ˙ = h(θ). In other words ξn converges to a common factor
representation ξ ∈ Ξb¯ and Rn converges to the corresponding moment matrix M¯(ξ ). 18
However, convergence with probability one requires a number of assumptions on the set
Q. The first one is obvious. Convergence to the set Θb¯ can of course occur only if the
projection set Q includes a non-empty subset of equilibrium representations. It is also
clear that the domain of the moment matrix R must be chosen such that the inverse is
well defined. The third assumption requires that Ξb¯ is a set of stationary common factor
representations. It is readily satisfied in a neighbourhood of Θb¯ if all eigenvalues of b¯
are inside the unit circle. The fourth assumption assures that the learning algorithm stays
within the domain of attraction of the mean dynamics. It holds in a neighbourhood of Θb¯,
if Θb¯ is an asymptotically stable set of the mean ODE.
As shown in proposition 2.3.3 convergence hinges on the question wether the set Θb¯ is
a locally asymptotically stable set of the mean ODE (120). The mean ODE of the learning
algorithm (124) can be computed as
ξ˙ = R−1M¯(ξ )(T (ξ )−ξ ) (127)
R˙ = M¯(ξ )−R. (128)
As noted by Marcet and Sargent (1989b), given a vector of beliefs ξ , the second com-
ponent of the mean dynamics (128) is globally asymptotically stable, so that R→ M¯(ξ ).
Setting R = M¯(ξ ) in the first component of the mean dynamics (127) yields the smaller
ODE (109), which defines E-stability (cmp. definition 2.2.7). For regular equilibria it has
been established formally by Marcet and Sargent (1989b) that E-stability is equivalent to
stability of the mean ODE. For the same technical reasons which make the analysis of
E-stability extremely complicated in case of sunspot equilibria it is hard to establish a con-
nection between E-stability and stability of the mean ODE. We conjecture that E-stability
and stability of the mean ODE are still equivalent, but in the presence of sunspots this re-
mains to be proven. Section 2.4 applies our results to a prime example of the literature
18We conjecture that it is also possible to derive an instability theorem, which states that there is conver-
gence with probability zero to a non-equilibrium point. We leave this for future research.
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on sunspots in monetary policy and illustrates numerically the convergence of RLS to a
common factor sunspot representation under E-stability.
2.4. Application
We will now apply the results of the previous sections to study the convergence of least
squares learning in a standard New Keynesian model.
zn = Enzn+1−σ−1(Rn−Enpin+1)+gn, (129)
pin = κzn+βEnpin+1+un. (130)
Here zn is the output gap, pin is the inflation rate and Rn is the nominal interest rate. The
demand shock gn and the cost push shock un are assumed to follow AR(1) processes with
damping parameters 0 ≤ ρg ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρu ≤ 1. The model (129)–(130) consists of a
forward looking dynamic IS-curve and a Philips curve. Monetary policy is assumed to set
interest rates according to the forward looking rule
Rn = φpiEnpin+1+φyEnyn+1. (131)
It is a well known fact that forward looking interest rate rules are susceptible to sunspots. As
we have shown in section 2.2 general form representations are always E-unstable in purely
forward looking models, whereas common factor representations are E-stable whenever the
MSV representation is E-stable. In contrast to the previous literature we have also shown
that the well known conditions on the derivatives of the T-map are necessary and sufficient
for E-stability (proposition 2.2.8). The following proposition applies these results to the
model (129)–(131).
PROPOSITION 2.4.1. Under a forward looking interest rate rule of the form (131) there
are sunspot equilibria with E-stable common factor representations if and only if
φpi +(1−β )κ−1φy > 1, (132)
κ(1+β )−1(φpi −1)+φy > 2σy. (133)
General form representations with b 6= 0 are always E-unstable.
PROOF. Proof see appendix A.2. 
Proposition 2.4.1 shows that common factor representations are E-stable provided the
Taylor principle holds (132) and the nominal interest rate responds sufficiently strong to
changes in the output gap (133). Moreover all general form representations, which do not
coincide with the MSV representation (i.e. with b 6= 0) are E-unstable. We conjecture
that E-stability of a set of sunspot representations in the sense of definition 2.2.7 is equiv-
alent to local stability under least squares learning. From proposition 2.3.3 we know that
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least squares learning converges to a sunspot equilibrium provided the mean ODE (120) is
asymptotically stable. The essential step which is still missing to proof the conjecture is the
proof that E-stability is equivalent to local asymptotic stability of the mean ODE. We will
now conduct a small simulation study for the New Keynesian model laid out above. The
results seem to support our hypothesis that E-stability of a set of common factor represen-
tations is both necessary and sufficient for the local convergence of least squares learning
towards the set.19
We calibrate the model with standard values from the literature. Qualitatively the re-
sults do not seem to be sensitive to the exact values which are chosen. We set the discount
factor to β = 0.99 and use the estimates κ = 0.024 and σ = 0.157 of Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). The damping parameters of the demand
shock ρg and the cost push shock ρu are set to 0.95 and 0.9. The standard deviations of
the shocks are both set to 0.05. The coefficients of the monetary policy rule are calibrated
to φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.5. By proposition 2.4.1 this calibration yields an E-stable set of
common factor representations, so we would expect convergence of recursive least squares
towards some common factor representation within this set. We initialise the sunspot mul-
tiplier at d = (1.5,0.2)′. All remaining estimates are initialised at some values close to the
common factor representation given by proposition 2.2.6. Qualitatively the results do not
seem to depend on the starting values. Figure 1 plots the sequence of recursive least squares
estimates for d obtained from a simulation of the model economy over 5000 periods.20 The
upper two graphs show the evolution of the impact multipliers of the sunspot shock on the
output gap (on the left) and on inflation (on the right). It can be seen that the impact of
the sunspot on the output gap is much larger than on inflation. Moreover both coefficients
seem to converge. The lower two figures contain a scatter plot of the two multipliers against
each other. The straight line is the continuum of sunspot equilibria. The left panel plots
the whole sequence of estimates, whereas the right panel plots only the last 1000 estimates.
In the right panel it can be seen that the estimates seem to settle down to a single point on
the line. Starting from some belief close to the set of sunspot equilibria, there seems to be
convergence to a particular sunspot equilibrium in the neighbourhood of the initial belief.
The point of convergence depends on the initial value for d and on the realised sequence of
shocks. Remarkably, in all simulations we have conducted convergence obtained without
imposition of a projection facility.
19One regularity condition which has to hold for this to be true is that all common factor representations
within the set are asymptotically stationary.
20We only plot the evolution of the estimates for d because all remaining parameters converge fairly
quickly to their equilibrium values.
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FIGURE 1. recursive least squares estimates of the sunspot multiplier d
If the agents stipulate that the equilibrium may change over time, then they may want
to keep track of these changes using a constant gain algorithm. Figure 2 plots the sequence
of estimates in case the agents use a constant gain algorithm to estimate both the common
factor representation and the resonant frequency of the sunspot.21 Interestingly the esti-
mates initially tend towards the set of equilibria. In contrast to the case of recursive least
squares, the beliefs do not settle down on a single value, but wander around within the set
of equilibrium values as can be seen from the lower right panel of figure 2.22 Again this
panel plots only the last 1000 estimates. The upper two panels of the figure show that the
impact of the sunspot fluctuates considerably under constant gain learning. Recall that the
straight line which represents the set of all equilibrium values of the sunspot multiplier d
contains the origin d = 0. Therefore, under adaptive learning, there may be periods when
sunspots have large effects on the economy and other periods when they are negligible.
As a consequence there may be periods with very high and periods with low output gap
21The resonant frequency can be estimated by a regression of ξn on ξn−1.
22Note that the effect, that the estimates wander around within the set of REERs disappears if the resonant
frequency is fixed at the true value. In this sense it is not innocuous to assume that the resonant frequency is
known as it is often done in the learning literature.
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FIGURE 2. recursive estimates of the sunspot multiplier d under constant
gain learning
volatility.23 Finally we want to remark that we have conducted numerous simulations for
choices of policy parameters, which yield E-unstable common factor or general form rep-
resentations. 24 In all these simulations least squares learning has diverged fairly quickly
suggesting that E-instability implies that least squares learning converges with probability
zero.
2.5. Conclusions
We have provided several new insights on E-stability and the convergence of least
squares learning to sunspot equilibria. In section 2.2 we have established necessary and
sufficient conditions for E-stability of common factor representations. In the presence of
sunspots standard stability results for differential equations are not applicable, which is
why a formal derivation of these conditions has been missing in the literature so far. In a
purely forward looking model common factor representations are E-stable if and only if the
23Of course the same is true for inflation, but – at least in our calibration – the impact of the sunspot on
the output gap is much larger.
24Recall that general form representations are E-unstable for all choices of the policy parameters (cf.
proposition 2.4.1).
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equilibrium is indeterminate and the MSV representation is E-stable. We have also proven
an instability result, which demonstrates that general form representations are always E-
unstable in purely forward looking models. We argue that both results extend to any model
with a sufficiently low degree of inertia. This explains why common factor representations
are often E-stable while general form representations are E-unstable. In section 2.3 we
have shown that under standard regularity assumptions least squares learning converges to
rational expectations provided the so called mean dynamics is stable. We use an approach
by Delyon (1996) to show almost sure convergence of least squares learning (augmented
with projection facilities) to a set of sunspot equilibria provided the set is locally asymptoti-
cally stable under the mean ODE. For locally isolated equilibrium representations (e.g. any
representation of a locally determinate equilibrium) it is well known in the literature that
stability of the mean ODE is equivalent to E-stability. However, sunspot representations are
in general not locally isolated. Instead there is a continuum of equilibrium representations.
We conjecture that stability of the mean ODE and E-stability are still equivalent, but this
remains to be proven.
Section 2.4 applies our E-stability results to a New Keynesian model with a forward
looking interest rate rule, which is the prime example of sunspots in monetary policy. From
section 2.4 we know that there is an E-stable set of common factor representations provided
the interest rate rule satisfies the Taylor principle and the nominal interest rate is very sensi-
tive to changes in the output gap. Moreover general form representations are never E-stable.
In order to assess our conjecture that E-stability is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the convergence of least squares learning we conduct a small simulation study. It turns out
that least squares seems to converge the set of common factor representations provided the
set is E-stable. Convergence takes place for all starting values in a neighbourhood of the
set even without imposition of a projection facility. The particular limit point within the
set depends on the initial beliefs of the agents and the realised shock sequence. In addi-
tion least squares seems to diverge if the agents try to learn an E-unstable general form or
common factor representation. If agents try to track parameter changes using a constant
gain learning algorithm the beliefs of the agents wander around within the set of common
factor representations. In this case learning can explain that there are periods where the
effect of sunspots on economic variables is large and other periods where it is negligible.
As a consequence there may be periods with high and periods with low volatility in the
data. We conjecture that this is a more general phenomenon, which has not been observed
previously and which is likely to occur in other models too.
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CHAPTER 3
Sticky Information, Adaptive Learning and the Great Moderation
3.1. Introduction
The substantial increase in macroeconomic performance across many industrialised
countries over the last decades has triggered a lot of work on the underlying causes. It
is widely accepted that the fall in average inflation and inflation volatility is mostly due
to improvements in the conduct of monetary policy. Most economists attribute the rise in
average inflation in the 1960s and 1970s to the attempt of monetary policy to exploit a
long run trade-off between inflation and the output gap or unemployment (cf. Taylor, 1996,
proposition 1). In the United States, monetary policy making seems to have changed sig-
nificantly with the appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank.
Clarida et al. (2000) claim in this regard that ’not until Volcker took office did controlling
inflation become the organising focus of monetary policy’. Since then it is widely believed
that in the long run monetary policy determines the average rate of inflation and has no
real effects, while there is a short run trade-off between the variability of inflation and the
output gap or unemployment. Thus there is a trade-off in the volatilities instead of the lev-
els of inflation and aggregate economic activity (cf. Taylor, 1996, proposition 2). Despite
the considerable agreement that improvements in the conduct of monetary policy led to the
stabilisation of inflation, the simultaneous decline in the volatility of aggregate economic
activity is very controversial.
One widespread view holds that monetary policy has been too accommodative with re-
spect to inflation expectations in the pre-Volcker period increasing interest rates less than
one-for-one with inflation expectations. Such a regime may lead to self-fulfilling expec-
tations because an increase in inflation expectations decreases the real interest rate, which
in turn increases economic activity, thus justifying the increased inflation expectations. In
contrast, with the beginning of the Volcker period the Federal Reserve managed to reduce
inflation expectations and bring down average inflation as well as inflation volatility by in-
creasing rates more than one-for-one with inflation. As argued by Clarida et al. (2000) this
fundamental change in monetary policy has led to greater macroeconomic stability. Apart
from the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations some economists attribute the moderation
of the volatility of the output gap to the decline in the average inflation rate. They argue that
low inflation reduces nominal distortions arising from taxation and insofar as low inflation
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means low expected inflation, it increases the possibilities of the Fed to react to unfore-
seen events (cf. Summers, 2005). In contrast McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) claim
that the reduction in the volatility of economic activity is completely unrelated to monetary
policy. They blame better practices in inventory management that have come along with
the increased adoption of information technology since the 1980s to be the cause for the
increased stability. Finally the great macroeconomic instability during the 1970s and 1980s
may simply have been bad luck. Among others Gordon (2005) claims that a series of large
supply shocks are responsible for the bad performance in that period.
This chapter focuses on the interaction of monetary policy and sticky information in
the presence of adaptive learning. The hypothesis we investigate is whether the break in
monetary policy with the appointment of Paul Volcker may have contributed to the Great
Moderation. The basic effect has been discovered by Branch et al. (2004). In a model with
a trade-off between inflation and output volatility an increased desire to stabilise inflation
leads to a direct decrease in inflation and increase in output volatility. In the presence
of endogenous inattention there is however also an indirect effect, which reduces both
volatilities. Depending on the size of both effects the volatility trade-off may breakdown.
The model of Branch et al. (2004) builds on the sticky information Philips curve sug-
gested by (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). In contrast to the sticky price literature, in the sticky
information approach agents set their prices optimally at each point in time. However, they
are assumed to update their information sets only sporadically, so that their decisions may
be based on outdated information. This assumption is usually justified by the presence of
limited capabilities and resources to process information as well as costs to collect infor-
mation. In Branch et al. (2004) suppliers endogenously choose the probability at which
they update their information sets given that updating information is costly. In such an
environment an increase in inflation hawkishness on part of the central bank can lead to
a simultaneous decline of inflation and output volatility. The immediate consequence is a
decline in the volatility of inflation and a rise in the volatility of the output gap. The decline
of inflation volatility in turn lowers the benefits of suppliers to update their information
sets. Given that the costs for information acquisition remain unchanged they will endoge-
nously choose to update their information less frequently, which amplifies the decrease in
the volatility of inflation and may even lead to an overall decline in the volatility of the
output gap. Branch et al. (2006) show that their model is stable under adaptive learning.
However, they also emphasise that their model is too simple to provide a description of the
actual historical experience and so they do not attempt to calibrate the model. The model
of Branch et al. (2006) is a version of the Mankiw and Reis (2002) model, which is not
microfounded. In order to clearly separate and illustrate the effects of sticky information
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the model consists of a version of a sticky information Philips curve, a quantity equation
and a simple money supply rule.
In this chapter we build on the subsequent work of Reis (2006), Mankiw and Reis
(2006a) and Mankiw and Reis (2006b) who extend the sticky information approach to a
general equilibrium framework. In contrast to Mankiw and Reis (2006a) and Mankiw and
Reis (2006b) we assume only suppliers choose their level of inattention, while consumers
and workers are completely attentive. 1 The model consists of a sticky information Philips
curve, an intertemporal IS curve and an interest rate rule. We find that for plausible pa-
rameter values the model is capable to generate a decline in both volatilities, which is
comparable to that found in the data. The fact that the agents need to learn about changes
in monetary policy means that their attentiveness adapts only gradually to the new equi-
librium. This introduces a significant short run trade-off between the volatility of inflation
and the output gap. However, in the long run the model seems to converge to the new ra-
tional expectations equilibrium. As in the data we find that the volatilities of inflation and
the output gap are highly correlated. Moreover the correlation between the volatilities is
much larger than the correlation between the levels. The following section 3.2 discusses
some empirical observations regarding the Great Moderation. Section 3.3 derives the model
and section 3.4 describes the rational expectations equilibrium and endogenous inattention.
Section 3.5 introduces adaptive learning. The simulation results of the calibrated economy
can be found in section 3.6, while section 3.7 concludes.
3.2. Empirical Facts
The sharp decline in US business cycle volatility is generally dated to the mid 1980s.
Some economists argue that the decline occurred rather suddenly, presumably in the first
quarter of 1984 (cf. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) or Kim and Nelson (1999)).
Others like Blanchard and Simon (2001) claim that there has been a steady decline over
several decades. Although the timing differs from country to country, most industrialised
countries have experienced a similar decline in the volatility of their business cycles during
the last decades (cf. Summers, 2005).
Figure 1 shows 230 quarters of data on US inflation, output growth and the output gap
from 1949:Q1 to 2006:Q2. Inflation is computed as the year over year percentage change
in the GDP price deflator. Output growth is the percentage year over year increase in real
GDP. Real GDP and the price deflator are taken from the FRED. The output gap is the
percentage deviation of real GDP from its potential, where potential real GDP is taken
from the CBO. It is apparent from figure 1 that there is a decline in the level of inflation
1The assumption of completely attentive consumers and producers reduces the dimension of the problem
considerably, especially if agents are learning and choose their updating probability endogenously.
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in the mid 1980s, which is generally associated with a break in monetary policy under Fed
chairman Paul Volcker. Before 1984 the inflation rate moves in a range between -2 and 10
percent with a mean of 3.8 percent compared to a range of 1 to 4 percent and a mean of 2.5
percent after 1984. Along with the decline of the level and the volatility of inflation, output
growth has become much more stable. Booms tend to last longer, while there is a narrower
gap between growth rates in booms and recessions after 1984 (Kim and Nelson, 1999). The
behaviour of the output gap confirms the increased stability of aggregate economic activity
following the mid 1980s.
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FIGURE 1. US data from 1949:Q1 to 2006:Q2
Figure 2 presents the 20-quarter rolling standard deviations of inflation, output growth
and the output gap. It confirms the impression from figure 1 that there is a sharp decline
in the volatilities of all three quantities. Compared to figure 1 the decline is delayed by a
few years and occurs in the late 1980s. The reason is that the rolling window is a backward
looking of the standard deviation. If we split the sample in the first quarter of 1984 the
results are even more dramatic. The standard deviation of inflation before 1984 is 2.67
compared to 0.76 afterwards. Thus it has dropped roughly to a quarter. The standard
deviations of output growth and the output gap both have dropped by roughly one half
from 2.94 and 2.99 to 1.52 and 1.51 respectively.
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Figures 1 and 2 suggest the decline in the level of inflation and inflation volatility may
have contributed to the moderation of business cycle volatility. The correlation between
the level of inflation and the volatility of output growth or the output gap is 0.13 and 0.18
respectively. Thus, the co-movement of the level of inflation and the volatility of economic
activity is positive but not particulary strong. Instead the correlation between the standard
deviations of inflation and output growth is 0.65 – between inflation and the output gap
it is 0.77. So the co-movement of the volatilities reinforces the impression from figure 2
that the Great Moderation of economic activity is linked to the moderation of inflation. It
is widely recognised that a break in the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy under chairman
Paul Volcker helped to bring down both average inflation and inflation volatility. Together
with the estimate that the break from high to low business cycle volatility occurred most
probably in the first quarter 1984, this is strong evidence that the change in monetary policy
is also part of the story of the Great Moderation. The model we will set up in the next
section establishes a strong link between the volatility of inflation and the volatility of
economic activity.
in
fla
ti
on
ou
tp
ut
gr
ow
th
ou
tp
ut
ga
p
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
FIGURE 2. standard deviations before/after 1984:Q1 vs. 20-quarter rolling
standard deviations
59
3.3. The Model
In this section we build a simple model for the inflation rate and the output gap. The
supply side of the model evolves according to a sticky information Philips curve as intro-
duced in Mankiw and Reis (2002). The demand side on the other hand follows a standard
intertemporal IS curve. The basic model can be seen as a special case of Mankiw and Reis
(2006b), where consumers and workers are assumed to be completely attentive. The ad-
vantage of focusing only on the inattentiveness of producers is that we get a two equation
model for inflation and the output gap, which is sufficiently tractable to allow us to endo-
genise inattention and to introduce adaptive learning. We will start with a presentation of
the model. Then we discuss the solution of the model under rational expectations and the
conditions for uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Finally we endogenise
the inattention parameter following Branch et al. (2004). The subsequent section will then
investigate whether the model with endogenous inattention and adaptively learning agents
is able to replicate the decline in the volatilities of inflation and the output gap after a break
in monetary policy comparable to the one experienced in the US during the 1980s.
Note that nominal variables will be denoted by upper case letters and real variables by
lower case letters. Denoting the aggregate price index by Pt , a nominal variable Vt and
the corresponding real variable vt are related via vt = Vt/Pt . Logarithmic deviations from
steady states will be marked with a hat.
3.3.1. Households. The typical household maximises his expected discounted lifetime
utility
E0
[ ∞
∑
t=0
δ tu(ct , lt)
]
, δ ∈ (0,1), (134)
where E0 is the conditional expectation as of time 0, δ is the rate of time preference and
u(·) is the per period utility given by
u(ct , lt) =
c1−σct −1
1−σc − γ
l1+σlt +1
1+σl
, γ ≥ 0. (135)
The household derives utility from consumption ct and leisure 1− lt , where lt ∈ (0,1)
denotes hours worked. The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in both
arguments and of the constant elasticity type. The parameters σc and σl are the inverse
intertemporal elasticities of substitution of consumption and leisure. The maximisation is
subject to the budget constraint
Bt +Ptct +Ptτt ≤ Ptwt lt +Rt−1Bt−1+Ωt . (136)
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The household receives income from labour Ptwt lt , dividends Ωt from the firms and gross
interest payments RtBt−1 from nominal bond holdings. It pays taxes for Ptτt and consump-
tion Ptct and invests in end of period nominal bond holdings Bt . Denoting inflation by
pit = Pt/Pt−1 the budget constraint in real terms is
bt + ct + τt = wt lt +pi−1t Rt−1bt−1+Ωt/Pt . (137)
The FOCs and the transversality condition of the household’s problem are
wtc
−σc
t = γl
σl
t , (138)
c−σct = δRtEt [c
−σc
t+1 /pit+1], (139)
0 = lim
t→∞δ
tuct bt . (140)
Aggregate consumption ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the consumption of a variety of
goods i ∈ (0,1)
ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
c(εt−1)/εtit di
)εt/(εt−1)
.
The parameter εt is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods at time t. It is as-
sumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. Cost minimisation on part of the house-
holds implies the optimal demand cit = (Pit/Pt)−εt ct for good i, where Pit is the price of
good i and the aggregate price index Pt is
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P(1−εt)it di
)1/(1−εt)
. (141)
3.3.2. Government. Monetary policy sets the nominal rate of interest Rt according to
a Taylor rule
Rt = φpi logpit +φz(logyt− logypt ). (142)
where pit = ∆Pt is the inflation rate and ypt refers to potential output. 2 Potential output y
p
t
is defined as the efficient level of output, which is the equilibrium level of output under
complete information and perfect competition. The government also purchases an aggre-
gate of individual goods gt , which is of the same form as the consumption aggregator of
households
gt ≡
(∫ 1
0
g(εt−1)/εtit di
)εt/(εt−1)
.
2Arguably there may be persistent deviations from the rule (142), cf. e.g. Rudebush (2002). However,
the introduction of a monetary policy shock would merely add another source of variation to the IS curve. In
this sense it is equivalent to a government expenditure shock.
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Optimisation by the government leads to the demand git = (Pit/Pt)−εt gt for good i. Market
clearing requires that for each good i, yit = cit +git . Defining aggregate output as
yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
y(εt−1)/εtit di
)εt/(εt−1)
,
it follows that the aggregate resource constraint can be written as
yt = ct +gt . (143)
Government expenditures gt are assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. To
finance government expenditures Ptgt the government issues nominal bonds Bt and collects
taxes Ptτt from the household. It also repays bond holdings RtBt−1 of the previous period
including interest. Thus the flow budget constraint of the government is
Bt +Ptτt = Ptgt +Rt−1Bt−1. (144)
Government bonds Bt+i are subject to the solvency constraint limi→∞(Bt+i∏i−1s=0 R
−1
t+s) = 0.
In real terms the budget constraint can be rewritten as
bt + τt = pi−1t Rt−1bt−1+gt . (145)
3.3.3. Firms. There is a continuum i ∈ (0,1) of monopolistically competitive firms
corresponding to each good i. Each firm produces yit units of the differentiated good i
using specialised labour lit . All firms share the same technology
yit = at l
β
it , (146)
where at is aggregate productivity and β measures the degree of returns to scale. We as-
sume that there is a fixed stock of capital, so that capital can be suppressed in the production
function and we can interpret β as the labour share. Aggregate productivity at follows an
exogenous stochastic process. Hours worked are aggregated according to lt =
∫ 1
0 litdi.
Following Mankiw and Reis (2006a) and Mankiw and Reis (2006b) we assume that
information is sticky. Each period a randomly drawn fraction λ of firms update their infor-
mation. A firm that has last updated its information j periods ago will choose its nominal
price Pjt to maximise expected real profits
max
Pjt
Et− j
[
Pjt/Pty jt−wt l jt
]
subject to the demand for good j
y jt = (Pjt/Pt)−εt yt (147)
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and the production technology (146). 3 The first order condition is
Pjt =
Et− j[εtwt l jt ]
Et− j[β (εt−1)y jt/Pt ] . (148)
The main focus throughout the chapter will lie on the determination of the updating prob-
ability λ . A high λ means firms update their information sets relatively often, whereas a
low level of λ corresponds to relatively infrequent updates of the information sets. A firm
which has not updated for a while cannot react to all shocks that have realised since its last
update. Therefore, all other things being equal, we would expect a decrease in the updat-
ing probability λ to lead to a reduction in the volatility of the price level. The updating
probability λ is often referred to as the ‘inattention parameter’ or ‘information acquisition
rate’.
3.3.4. The Log-LinearisedModel. We start with the computation of the efficient level
of output, which is the equilibrium level of output under complete information and perfect
competition in the absence of nominal rigidities. Under complete information (148) can be
rewritten as
Pjt
Pt
= µt
wt l jt
βy jt
. (149)
where µt is the markup given by µt = εt/(εt − 1). The system of equations (146), (147)
and (149) yields a unique solution for the individual output y jt . Thus under complete
information all firms will choose the same level of output. The demand function (147)
then implies a relative price Pjt/Pt equal to unity. It follows that the efficient level of output
ypt is implicitly defined by the relation
1 =
wt(y
p
t /at)1/β
βypt
. (150)
We are now ready to compute a log-linear approximation of the model around its non-
stochastic steady state. Log-linearisation of the household’s first order conditions (138)
and (139) yields
wˆt = σccˆt +σl lˆt , (151)
cˆt = Et cˆt+1−σ−1c (Rˆt−Et pˆit+1). (152)
3There is a slight abuse of notation because there is actually a continuum of firms with mass λ (1−λ ) j,
who all set a price Pit for good i based on information, which is j periods old. However, they all solve the
same problem based on the same information, so we do not need to distinguish them.
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The resource constraint (143) and the aggregate of the production function (146) can be
approximated as 4
yˆt = c/ycˆt + gˆt , (153)
yˆt = aˆt +β lˆt . (154)
Using the resource constraint (153) and the production function (154) we can rewrite the
expression for the real wage (151) as
wˆt = (σy+σl/β )yˆt−σygˆt−σl/β aˆt , (155)
σy ≡ y/cσc is the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate expenditure.
Provided the distortions from the markup are sufficiently small we can approximate the
efficient output (150) by 5
yˆpt = Ξaaˆt +Ξggˆt , (156)
with
Ξa =
1+σl
β (σy−1)+σl +1 and Ξg =
βσy
β (σy−1)+σl +1 . (157)
The real wage has been substituted out using (155). Using the production function (146)
and the demand function (147) to substitute out hours worked l jt and the demand y jt for
good j, the log-linearised first order condition (148) of the firms’ pricing problem is
Pˆjt = Et− j
[
Pˆt +
β wˆt +(1−β )yˆt − aˆt −β/(ε−1)εˆt
β + ε(1−β )
]
. (158)
Up to a first order approximation the price index (141) equals Pˆt = λ ∑∞j=0(1−λ ) jPˆjt . Let
zt = yt − ypt be the output gap. Combining the price index with the expressions for the
optimal price (158), the real wage (155) and potential output (150) we have
Pˆt = λ
∞
∑
j=0
(1−λ ) jEt− j
[
Pˆt +α zˆt + uˆt
]
, (159)
with α = (β (σy− 1)+σl + 1)/(β + ε(1− β )) and uˆt = −β/[(ε − 1)(β + ε(1− β ))]εˆt .
Note that due to our assumption of sticky information the current price level depends on
all past expectations of the current price level, the output gap and the shock uˆt . The shock
uˆt is often called a cost push shock. Although we have derived it as a shock on the markup
of the producers, market power in the labour market or time-varying taxes would enter the
model in the same way.
4For notational convenience we follow the standard practice and let gˆt denote the deviation of gt from
its steady state value expressed as a percentage of the steady state value of aggregate output yt , i.e. gˆt =
(gt −g)/y.
5For details of the approximation confer the discussion in Woodford (2003b) about the ‘smallΦy approx-
imation’.
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For 0 < λ < 1 the equation for the price level can be transformed in a relationship for
the inflation rate pˆit = ∆Pˆt , which has been labelled the sticky information Philips curve (cf.
also Mankiw and Reis, 2002) 6
pˆit =
λ
1−λ (α zˆt + uˆt)+λ
∞
∑
j=0
(1−λ ) jEt−1− j[pˆit +α∆zˆt +∆uˆt ]. (160)
Combining the intertemporal Euler equation (152) with the aggregate resource constraint
(153) and the equation for potential output (150) we obtain the intertemporal IS curve
zˆt = Et zˆt+1−σ−1y (Rˆt−Et pˆit+1)+ vˆt . (161)
where vˆt =Et [∆yˆpt+1−∆gˆt+1] =Et [Ξa∆aˆt+1−(1−Ξg)∆gˆt+1]. Due to consumption smooth-
ing the output gap today depends positively on the output gap tomorrow and negatively on
the real rate of interest Rˆt −Et pˆit+1. The demand shock vˆt is a composite shock which re-
flects predictable changes in potential output and government expenditures. A predictable
rise in productivity raises the current output gap just as an anticipated fall in government
expenditures (Ξg < 1). Other possible sources for the demand shock that would enter the
model in the same way as the government expenditure shock are fluctuations in the house-
hold’s preferences or a monetary policy shock.
The final model consists of the sticky information Philips curve (160), the intertemporal
IS curve (161) and the log-linearisation of the Taylor rule
Rˆt = φpi pˆit +φyzˆt . (162)
For the exogenous processes of the cost push shock and the demand shock we assume that
they follow the AR(1) processes
uˆt = ρvuˆt−1+ eu,t and vˆt = ρvvˆt−1+ ev,t , (163)
where eu,t and eu,t are white noise with standard deviations σu and σv respectively.
Under rational expectations the nominal rate of interest can be substituted out of the IS
curve using the Taylor rule. The resulting reduced form IS curve will be needed to compute
the rational expectations equilibrium. Combining (161) and (162) we get the reduced IS
curve
zˆt = (σy+φy)−1(σyEt zˆt+1−φpi pˆit +Et pˆit+1+σyvˆt). (164)
6Under full attention (λ = 1) equation (159) simplifies to zt =−ut/α .
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3.4. Equilibrium Concepts
3.4.1. Rational Expectations Equilibrium. A remarkable insight of Wang and Wen
(2006) is that the introduction of sticky information does not change the determinacy prop-
erties of a log-linear DSGE model. Thus it suffices to check determinacy under the as-
sumption that all agents have complete information. It is then easy to check that the model
is determinate if and only if the Taylor principle holds (φpi>1). Thus, in contrast to a New
Keynesian model with sticky prices, output gap stabilisation (i.e. φz > 0) does not con-
tribute to equilibrium uniqueness. 7 The intuition for this result is as follows. In the New
Keynesian model with sticky prices, a permanent increase in inflation is accompanied by a
permanent increase in the output gap. Therefore, a tightening of monetary policy following
an increase in the output gap reduces the danger of self-fulfilling inflation. In the sticky
information version of the model this not true. Rearranging equation (160) we have
zˆt = (1−λ )zˆt−1+ λα
∞
∑
j=1
(1−λ ) j+1[pˆit +∆zˆt−Et− j(pˆit +∆zˆt)]+ wˆt , (165)
where wˆt is some exogenous stochastic process. Obviously, a permanent increase in infla-
tion will increase both inflation and expected inflation and leave the output gap unchanged.
To compute the REE we can write the aggregate price index and the output gap as a
function of all past disturbances and use the method of undetermined coefficients. Define
Λn = λ ∑ni=0(1−λ )i, which is the size of agents that have updated their information sets
within the last n periods. Moreover let s ∈ S = {u,v} denote the cost push shock and the
demand shock and let 1s=v(s) be the indicator function of the demand shock, which equals
unity if s = v and zero otherwise. For 0 < λ ≤ 1 the rational expectations equilibrium can
now be computed using the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.4.1. Assume that 0 < λ ≤ 1. Let s ∈ S = {u,v} denote the cost push
shock and the demand shock. Let pn(s) or zn(s) be the impact of shock s at lag n on prices
or the output gap respectively. Then
Pˆt =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
pn(s)es,t−n, zˆt =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
zn(s)es,t−n. (166)
Define the parameters
An = 1+
σy
α
1−Λn
Λn
Bn = 1+φpi +
σy+φy
α
1−Λn
Λn
(167)
7Recall that the analogous condition with a sticky price version of the Philips curve pit = κzt +βEtpit+1
is that φpi +(1−β )/κφz > 1 (cf. e.g. Woodford, 2003b).
66
and
Cn(s) =
{
(σy(1−ρu)+φy)/αρnu for s = u
σyρnv for s = v
. (168)
For s ∈ S = {u,v} the coefficients of the law of motion of the price level pn(s) solve the
second order difference equation
An+1 pn+1(s)−Bn pn(s)+φpi pn−1(s) =−Cn(s). (169)
with the boundary conditions p−1 = 0 and limn→∞(pn− pn−1) = 0. The coefficients of the
law of motion of the output gap are
zn(s) = α−1
[
(1−Λn)/Λn pn(s)−1s=u(s)ρnu
]
. (170)
Equation (170) is a direct consequence of the method of undetermined coefficients
applied to the aggregate supply relation (159). Application of the same method to the
IS curve (164) and using equation (170) to substitute out the coefficients of the output
gap yields the difference equation (169). To solve (169) we use the same approach as
Mankiw and Reis (2006b). First we choose some large enough N and set CN = 0. Then we
numerically solve the linear system of equations (169) for n = 0, . . . ,N with p−1 = 0 and
pN−1 = pN . The output gap coefficients follow from (170).
3.4.2. Endogenous Inattention. In the previous paragraph we have derived the ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium of the model taking the inattention parameter as given. In
this paragraph we follow Branch et al. (2006) and let agents endogenously choose their
information acquisition rate λ . Recall that in equilibrium both the price level Pt(λ¯ ) and the
output gap zt(λ¯ ) are functions of the economy wide information acquisition rate, which we
subsequently denote by λ¯ . From equation (158) we see that the optimal price of a producer
who has updated j periods ago is
Pˆjt(λ¯ ) = Et− j[Pˆt(λ¯ )+α zˆt(λ¯ )+ uˆt ]. (171)
Let P∗t (λ , λ¯ ) be the price charged by a specific firm, which updates its information each
period with probability λ given that the economy wide updating probability equals λ¯ . Let
st be a signal which takes on the value st = 1 if the firm updates its information in period t
and st = 0 if not. Then the prices charged by the firm will evolve according to
P∗t (λ , λ¯ ) =
{
Pˆ0t(λ¯ ) if st = 1
Pˆjt(λ¯ ) if st− j = 1, st− j+1 = . . .= st = 0
, (172)
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where λ = Prob(st = 1). 8 Following Branch et al. (2006) we assume that producers
choose their information acquisition rate λ to minimise the unconditional mean squared
error between their price P∗t (λ , λ¯ ) and the price under complete information P∗t (1, λ¯ ) =
Pˆ0t(λ¯ ) given that information is costly. This leads to the definition of the loss function
L(λ , λ¯ ) = MSE(λ , λ¯ )+Cλ 2, (173)
where MSE(λ , λ¯ ) = E(Pˆ0t(λ¯ )−P∗t (λ , λ¯ ))2 is the unconditional mean squared error. We
assume that the process of acquiring and processing information is costly (C > 0). The
best response function of a specific firm maps all aggregate levels of inattention λ¯ into an
individually optimal value of inattention
B(λ¯ ) = arg min
λ∈(0,1]
L(λ , λ¯ ). (174)
The following proposition establishes that the mean squared error made by the producers
is strictly decreasing and convex in λ . It follows that the minimum in (174) exists because
the mean squared error is strictly decreasing in λ , whereas the marginal costs of updating
2Cλ vanish as λ goes to zero. Therefore it is optimal to choose λ > 0. The fact that the
mean squared error is a strictly convex function of λ implies that the loss function L(λ , λ¯ )
is also strictly convex in λ so that the minimum in (174) is unique for all λ¯ .
PROPOSITION 3.4.2. The mean squared error MSE(λ , λ¯ ) is a strictly decreasing and
convex function of λ .
PROOF. Obviously it is sufficient to show that the mean squared error is a convex func-
tion of λ . From the definition of the optimal price under sticky information (172) it follows
that
Pˆ0t(λ¯ )−P∗t (λ , λ¯ ) =
{
0 if st = 1
Pˆ0t(λ¯ )− Pˆjt(λ¯ ) if st− j = 1, st− j+1 = . . .= st = 0 . (175)
Combining equations (166) and (171) yields the MA(∞) representation
Pˆjt(λ¯ ) =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n= j
(p¯n(s)+α z¯n(s)− cn(s))es,t−n (176)
where
cn(s) =
{ β
(ε−1)(β + ε(1−β ))ρ
n
u if s = ε
0 if s = v
. (177)
8Note that a deviation of a single firm off equilibrium has no effect upon the aggregate price level or the
output gap because there is a continuum of firms. The optimal price of a firm in turn depends on the level of
inattention only indirectly through its effect on the price level and the output gap. Therefore the optimal price
of a firm which plans to deviate from the aggregate level of inattention does not depend the inattentiveness
that it plans to choose, i.e. a firm with information as of t− j will set a price equal to Pˆjt(λ¯ ).
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The bar over p¯n and z¯n indicates the implicit dependence on λ¯ . It follows that
Pˆ0t(λ¯ )− Pˆjt(λ¯ ) =∑
s∈S
j−1
∑
n=0
(p¯n(s)+α z¯n(s)− cn(s))es,t−n. (178)
Combining the law of motion (175) and the representation (178) of the forecast error we
get the expression for the mean squared error
E(Pˆ0t(λ¯ )−P∗t (λ , λ¯ ))2 = ∑
s∈S
λ
∞
∑
j=1
(1−λ ) j
j−1
∑
n=0
(p¯n(s)+α z¯n(s)− cn(s))2σ2s
= ∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
(1−λ )n+1(p¯n(s)+α z¯n(s)− cn(s))2σ2s . (179)
From (179) it follows immediately that ∂MSE/∂λ < 0 and ∂ 2MSE/∂λ 2 > 0. 
Taking the aggregate information acquisition rate and the resulting processes for the
price level and the output gap as given an individual firm minimises its loss over its indi-
vidual information acquisition rate. The fixed point of this process is a Nash equilibrium,
which we label endogenous inattention. 9
DEFINITION 3.4.3. Endogenous inattention is a symmetric Nash equilibrium defined
by the fixed point λ ∗ = B(λ ∗).
The following proposition establishes that endogenous inattention always exists. How-
ever the Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique even though this will be the case in the
calibration below.
PROPOSITION 3.4.4. Endogenous inattention exists.
PROOF. The proof is complicated slightly by the fact that the price index is not well
defined for λ¯ = 0. Consider the limit
lim
λ¯→0
B(λ¯ ) = lim
λ¯→0
arg min
λ∈(0,1]
L(λ , λ¯ )
= arg min
λ∈(0,1]∑s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
(1−λ )n+1( lim
λ¯→0
p¯n(s)+α lim
λ¯→0
z¯n(s)− cn(s))2σ2s +Cλ 2
With limλ¯→0 p¯(u) = limλ¯→0 z¯(u) = limλ¯→0 p¯(v) = 0 and limλ¯→0 z¯(v) =
σy
σy(1−ρy)+φyρ
n
v , it
follows that
lim
λ¯→0
B(λ¯ ) = arg min
λ∈(0,1]
(1−λ )k1
1−ρ2v (1−λ )
+ (1−λ )k2
1−ρ2u (1−λ )
+Cλ 2 > 0,
9The definition is taken from Branch et al. (2004).
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where k1 and k2 are positive constants. The minimum exists because
lim
λ→0
∂
∂λ
(
(1−λ )k1
1−ρ2v (1−λ )
+ (1−λ )k2
1−ρ2u (1−λ )
+Cλ 2
)
< 0.
Consider the function f : (0,1]→ (0,1] defined by f (λ¯ ) = B(λ¯ )− λ¯ . We have just estab-
lished that f (λ¯ ) > 0 for some λ¯ > 0. We assume that f (1) < 0, since otherwise there is
nothing to prove. Noting that f (λ¯ ) is continuous it follows from the intermediate value
theorem that B has at least one fixed point. 
3.5. Adaptive Learning
The main focus of this chapter is on the interaction of adaptive learning and endogenous
inattention. Under adaptive learning the timing is as follows. First the agents in the econ-
omy who have updated their information sets use the data on prices and the output gap that
has realised up to the current period to estimate a new forecasting model. Then they use
the estimated processes for the data to choose the currently optimal inattention parameter.
Then all agents use their current forecasting models to form their expectations. Finally, the
expectations and the chosen inattention parameters determine the new realisations of prices
and the output gap.
The first step in the learning process is the estimation of a perceived relationship for
inflation and the output gap. We assume that the perceived laws of motion of inflation and
the output gap are of the same functional form as the rational expectations equilibrium
representation (166). Thus, each period, the agents who update their information sets
estimate two moving average processes of the form
Pˆt =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
pˆn(s)es,t−n, zˆt =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
zˆn(s)es,t−n, (180)
where pˆn(s) and zˆn(s) is the estimated impact of shock s at lag n on prices and the output
gap. Recall that s ∈ {u,v} is a placeholder for the markup and the demand shock. 10
Each period the fraction of producers who update their information set also solve for the
optimal information acquisition rate λt . In the learning literature it is standard to separate
forecasting and decision problems. In this tradition we assume that the firms take the
estimated perceived law of motion as given when choosing the optimal inattentiveness.
Using the expression (179) for the mean squared error the estimated loss function is
L(λ ) =∑
s∈S
∞
∑
n=0
(1−λ )n+1(pˆn(s)+α zˆn(s)− cn(s))2σ2s +Cλ 2. (181)
10We follow the standard practice in the learning literature and assume that the agents can observe the
shocks. Therefore the coefficients of the perceived law of motion can be estimated recursively using ordinary
least squares.
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where cn(s) is the exponentially decaying series given by (177). Taking the estimates of the
perceived law of motion as given the currently optimal rate of inattention can be computed
as
λt = arg min
λ∈(0,1]
L(λ ). (182)
Proposition 3.4.2 applies analogously, so that λt is uniquely defined. Based on their most
recent estimates, the agents compute forecasts of the price level, the output gap, the inflation
rate and output gap growth, i.e. they calculate
∀ j > 0 : EtPt+ j, Etzt+ j, Etpit+ j. (183)
Finally, given the expectations of the agents the actual law of motion of the price level and
the output gap are
Pˆt =
∞
∑
j=0
wt, jEt− j[Pˆt +α zˆt + uˆt ] (184)
zˆt = Et zˆt+1−σ−1y (Rˆt−Et pˆit+1)+ vˆt (185)
where the weights wt, j evolve according to
wt, j =
{
(1−λt− j)wt−1, j−1 if j > 1
∑∞i=0λt−iwt−1,i if j = 0
. (186)
The weight wt, j reflects the proportion of producers at time t who last updated their in-
formation set j periods ago. Under learning the weights become history dependant. The
fraction of producers who last updated their information sets in period t− j will stick to
the optimal information acquisition rate λt− j at the time of their last update. So the size of
agents with information from period t− j will decay at the rate 1−λt− j. Provided λt con-
verges to a fixed value λ∞, the weights converge to w∞, j = λ∞(1−λ∞) j so that eventually
the price level under learning (159) converges to the price level under rational expectations
(184) with λ = λ∞. 11
The following section presents a simulation of a calibrated instance of the model. As in
the computation of the rational expectations equilibrium of the model we have to truncate
all infinite sums at some number N. For sufficiently large N the particular choice of the
truncation point seems to be irrelevant.
11Note that Branch et al. (2006) use a different definition for the weights, which is incorrect in the tran-
sition to the equilibrium. Especially it can be checked that the weights in their definition do not necessarily
sum up to one.
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3.6. Simulation Results
We will now conduct a simulation study, which is intended to check in how far the small
learning model we have constructed is capable to produce a simultaneous decline of the
volatility in inflation and the output gap. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of output to σy = 1 and the sensitivity of the firm’s relative price with respect to changes in
the output gap to α = 0.1. The parameters of the Taylor rule are set to φpi,1 = 1.1 and φy,1 =
0.1 before the break and φpi,2 = 1.5 and φy,2 = 0.2 thereafter. For the stochastic processes we
set the AR(1) parameters to ρu = 0.9 for the cost push shock and ρv = 0.95 for the demand
shock. The standard deviations of the shocks are calibrated to σu = 0.23 and σv = 0.05.
Finally we choose information costs to equal C = 25. We deliberately choose a coefficient
φpi,1 > 1 for the period before the break in order to obtain a determinate equilibrium both
before and after the break in monetary policy. Many authors have estimated a feedback
coefficient φpi for inflation in the Taylor rule, which is slightly below one (cf. Clarida et al.,
2000). Yet, we choose a value which is marginally above one because we want to abstract
from any changes in the volatilities due to sunspots.
The calibration implies a Nash equilibrium of λ¯1 = 0.41 for the period before the break
and a value of λ¯2 = 0.27 thereafter. Thus on average the producers update their information
set every two and a half periods before and every four periods after the break. The value
after the break is in line with the estimates of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Khan and Zhu
(2002). Figure 3 plots the best response function of the producers under both regimes.
There is a unique Nash equilibrium under both regimes. Moreover both equilibria are
globally stable in the sense that B′ < 1.
The calibration has been chosen to replicate closely the volatility of inflation and the
output gap we have found in the data. Table 1 compares the standard deviations of the data
to the equilibrium values for the calibrated model. The column ‘fixed inattention’ reports
the volatilities for the case where the inattentiveness of the producers is exogenously fixed
at the level before the break. In the data the standard deviation of inflation drops by 72%
– the standard deviation of the output gap by 49%. Keeping the inattentiveness fixed the
standard deviation in the model fall by 46% in case of inflation and rises by 18% in case of
the output gap, reflecting the orthodox volatility trade-off. Under endogenous inattention
the decline in the attentiveness of the producers leads to an overall decline in the standard
deviations by 70% and 30% respectively. So, under rational expectations we would expect
an increase in the output gap by 18% if we fix the inattentiveness exogenously. However
the endogenous reaction in the information acquisition of the producers leads to an overall
decline by 30% as suggested by the actual historical experience.
We simulate the model over 10,000. We initialise the beliefs of the agents, i.e. the MA
parameters of the reduced form they estimate and the initial inattention parameter at their
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FIGURE 3. best response functions before and after the break in monetary
policy
data model model
endo. inattention fixed inattention
σpi σz σpi σz σpi σz
before
the break
2.67 2.99 2.29 2.28 2.29 2.28
after
the break
0.76 1.52 0.67 1.6 1.23 2.77
change -72% -49% -70% -30% -46% +18%
TABLE 1. standard deviations of the model and the actual data
respective values under rational expectations. Agents learn using recursive least squares.
In order to allow the agents to track structural changes in the model, we assume that they
discount past data with a discount factor of 0.99. In period 2,000 we change the parameters
of the Taylor rule from (φpi,1,φy,1) to (φpi,2,φy,2) to simulate the break in monetary policy.
Figure 4 plots the evolution of the inattention parameter under learning. The model seems
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to be stable under learning as the beliefs of the agents including the inattention parameter
stay constant before the break. After the break the inattention parameter falls continuously
until the new equilibrium value is reached to which it appears to converge.
λ
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FIGURE 4. evolution of the updating probability λt under learning
Figure 5 plots the volatility of inflation and the output gap under learning (solid line)
against the equilibrium volatilities with endogenous inattention (dashed line) and with ex-
ogenously fixed inattention (dotted line). In the case of exogenous inattention we compute
the equilibrium values for the volatility of inflation and the output gap keeping the inatten-
tion parameter fixed at the value before the break. This benchmark shows which part of the
volatilities is due to the break in monetary policy and which part is due to the endogenous
change of the level of inattention of the producers in response to the policy break. In the
case where the updating probability of the producers is exogenously given we see that there
is a trade-off between the volatility of inflation and the output gap. The increased focus on
inflation stabilisation will in equilibrium reduce the volatility of inflation but at the same
time increase the volatility of the output gap. However the Nash equilibrium value for
the updating probability decreases from λ¯1 = 0.41 before the break to λ¯2 = 0.27 after the
break. Instead of updating every two and a half periods agents will on average only want to
update every four periods. This is a result of the increased stability of inflation, which re-
sults in a lower volatility of the optimal price charged by the producers. As a consequence
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information will disseminate more slowly in the economy. Thus if the producers choose
their information acquisition rate endogenously both volatilities will decrease compared
to the exogenous case. This effect can be so large that the trade-off between the volatil-
ity of inflation and aggregate economic activity breaks down, which is what we see in the
calibration.
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FIGURE 5. standard deviations under learning compared to the equilibrium
values in case of exogenous and endogenous inattention
Under rational expectations we would see an immediate drop in both volatilities. The
fact that we model learning as being adaptive introduces inertia in the beliefs of the agents.
In the short run the inattention parameter does not change very much, so that the volatility
of the output gap increases, whereas the volatility of the inflation rate falls rather quickly.
The initial rise in the volatility of inflation leads to revisions in the beliefs of the agents
that increase the volatility even further. Therefore the short run volatility trade-off is even
steeper under learning than in the case of exogenous inattention. However, as new data
arrives the agents revise their beliefs towards the new equilibrium so that in the long run
the trade-off breaks down and both volatilities converge to their new equilibrium values.
The magnitude of the rise of the volatility of the output gap in the short run and the speed
of convergence to the new equilibrium depend on the details of the way agents learn, i.e.
their perceived law of motion of the economy, the learning algorithm and the parameters
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of the learning algorithm. The qualitative result however is independent of the specific
implementation of the learning algorithm. Adaptive learning introduces a short run trade-
off between the stabilisation of inflation and the output gap, whereas in the long run the
beliefs of the producers converge to the new equilibrium so that both volatilities decline.
3.7. Conclusions
We have set up a model of inflation and the output gap in which the information of pro-
ducers about the economy is sticky. In order to set their prices optimally producers need to
forecast aggregate economic variables like inflation and the output gap. We have assumed
that the producers choose their information acquisition rate to balance the forecast error
they make against the cost associated with the information acquisition. Monetary policy
sets the nominal interest rate as a linear feedback rule of inflation and the output gap. In our
calibration exercise we have shown that in the long run a shift of monetary policy towards
inflation stabilisation may lead to a simultaneous decline in both the volatility of inflation
and the output gap. The traditional trade-off between the stabilisation of inflation and the
output gap eventually breaks down as the producers choose to update their information less
frequently. The reason for them to update less frequently is that a reduction in inflation
volatility also reduces the volatility of the price they would like to set if information were
costless. Although in the long run monetary policy faces no trade-off, the inertia in the
beliefs introduced by adaptive learning creates a volatility trade-off in the short run. The
short run trade-off introduced by learning may even be steeper than the traditional trade-off
in a model without learning and endogenous inattention.
Our results show that a model with sticky information, endogenous inattention and
adaptively learning agents may produce a ‘great moderation’ as a consequence of a shift
in monetary policy towards more inflation stabilisation. The coincidence of the break in
US monetary policy under Fed chairman Paul Volcker and the break in the volatility of
the output gap suggest that monetary policy may at least have contributed some part to the
great moderation. A New Keynesian model with sticky information and adaptively learning
agents gives an explanation how a shift in monetary policy can lead to a long run decline in
both volatilities, while at the same time preserving a significant trade-off in the short run.
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Appendix
A.1. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1. First and Second Order Forms (Positive Bond Holdings). Under contempo-
raneous data rules the monetary policy feedback rule Rt = φpi pˆit +φzzˆt can be substituted in
(21) to yield
bˆt = (β−1− γ1)bˆt−1−β−1(pˆit−φpi pˆit−1−φzzˆt−1)+ gb gˆt . (A.1)
To obtain a second order form use (19), (20) and the interest rate rule Rˆt = φpi pˆit +φzzˆt to
solve for inflation
pˆit =
κ+β (σy+φz)
φz+σy+φpiκ
Et pˆit+1+
κσy
φz+σy+φpiκ
Et zˆt+1+
κσyρg
φz+σy+φpiκ
gˆt , (A.2)
where ρg = g/y+σc/(σy+σl)g/c. Substituting this result in (A.1) yields
bˆt = −φz+σy+β
−1κ
φz+σy+φpiκ
Et pˆit+1− β
−1κσy
φz+σy+φpiκ
Et zˆt+1+β−1φpi pˆit−1
+ β−1φzzˆt−1+(β−1− γ1)bˆt−1+
(
g
b
− β
−1κσyρg
φz+σy+φpiκ
)
gˆt . (A.3)
In case of the forward data rules Rˆt = φpiEt pˆit+1+φzEˆtzt+1 solve (19) and (20) for
pˆit = (β +κσ−1y (1−φpi))Et pˆit+1+κ(1−σ−1y φz)Et zˆt+1+κρggˆt . (A.4)
Substitute pˆit in (21) to obtain
bˆt = −(1+κβ−1σ−1y (1−φpi))Et pˆit+1−κβ−1(1−σ−1y φz)Et zˆt+1 (A.5)
+ (β−1− γ1)bˆt−1+β−1Rˆt−1+
(g
b
−β−1κρg
)
gˆt . (A.6)
In order to get a second order form in (pˆit , zˆt , bˆt) we need to replace Rˆt−1. Therefore solve
(19) and (20) for
Et pˆit+1 = β−1
(
pˆit−κ zˆt
)
, (A.7)
Et zˆt+1 =
φpi −1
β (σy−φz) pˆit +
κ(1−φpi)+βσy
β (σy−φz) zˆt−
σyρg
σy−φz gˆt . (A.8)
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These expressions can be used to transform any forward data rule in an equivalent contem-
poraneous data rule Rˆt = ϕpi pˆit +ϕzzˆt +ϕggˆt , where
ϕpi = β−1
(
φpi +φz
φpi −1
σy−φz
)
, ϕz = β−1
(
φz
κ(1−φpi)+βσy
σy−φz −φpiκ
)
. (A.9)
Substituting the equivalent contemporaneous data rule in (A.6) yields the desired form for
the bond equation. With Rˆt = φpi pˆit−1+φzzˆt−1 equations (19) and (20) can once again be
solved for inflation
pˆit = (β +κσ−1y )Et pˆit+1+κEt zˆt+1−κσ−1y (φpi pˆit−1+φyzˆt−1)+κρggˆt . (A.10)
Combining this equation for pˆit with (21) we can derive an equivalent expression for bonds
in the lagged data case:
bˆt = −(1+κβ−1σ−1y )Et pˆit+1−κβ−1Et zˆt+1+κβ−1σ−1y (φpi pˆit−1+φyzˆt−1)
+ (β−1− γ1)bˆt−1+β−1Rˆt−1+
(
g
b
−β−1κρg
)
gˆt . (A.11)
A.1.2. Eigenvalue Criteria.
A.1.2.1. Roots in the Unit Disk. Let p(z) be the polynomial
p(z) := anzn+an−1zn−1+ . . .+a0 (A.12)
and p∗(z) be the corresponding reciprocal polynomial given by
p∗(z) := a¯0zn+ a¯1zn−1+ . . .+ a¯n, (A.13)
where a¯i is the complex conjugate of ai. Define the Schur transform of p by
T p(z) := a¯0 p(z)−an p∗(z) (A.14)
and the iterated Schur transforms T k(p) recursively for all k > 1 by T k(p) := T (T k−1 p).
Define γk := T k p(0). Then Henrici (1988) proofs the following two results:
THEOREM A.1.1. Let p be a polynomial of degree n, p 6= 0. Then all roots lie outside
the closed unit disk |z| ≤ 1 if and only if γk > 0, k = 1, . . . ,n.
PROOF. See Henrici (1988) p.493 theorem 6.8b. 
THEOREM A.1.2. Let γk satisfy γk 6= 0, k = 1, . . . ,n. Define
pik :=
k
∏
j=1
γ j. (A.15)
Then there are r roots inside the unit circle and n− r roots outside the unit circle if and
only if r products are negative and n− r are positive.
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PROOF. The proposition follows directly from Henrici (1988) p.494 proposition 6.8c
and the following discussion, which demonstrates that the number of negative elements in
the sequence {pik} is equal to ∑mj=1(−1) j−1(n+1− k j). 
Note that the proposition is not applicable if γk = 0 for some k. This is the case when-
ever p is self reciprocal, i.e. its roots are pairwise symmetric to the unit circle.12 For a
polynomial p(λ ) = λ 2+ c1λ + c2 of degree two we have
γ1 = c22−1 γ2 = (c2−1)2
(
(c2+1)2− c21
)
.
Then the following corollary is a direct application of proposition A.1.2.
COROLLARY A.1.3. If p is a polynomial of degree two given by p(λ ) = λ 2+c1λ +c2
and p is not self–reciprocal, then:13
• both roots are inside the unit circle if and only if
|c2| < 1, (A.16)
|c1| < c2+1. (A.17)
• both roots are outside the unit circle if and only if
|c2| > 1, (A.18)
|c1| < |c2+1|. (A.19)
• one root is inside and one root is outside the unit circle if and only if
|c1| > |c2+1|. (A.20)
Regarding polynomials of degree three p(λ ) = λ 3+ c1λ 2+ c2λ + c3 we only need the
conditions for the case where one root is inside and two roots are outside the unit circle.
The following proposition is taken from Woodford (2003b, p.673).
PROPOSITION A.1.4. There is one root inside and two outside the unit circle if and
only if either of the following three cases holds: 14
(Case I)
1+ c1+ c2+ c3 < 0, (A.21)
−1+ c1− c2+ c3 > 0. (A.22)
12One special case of this symmetry occurs when some roots lie on the unit circle.
13The property that p is not self–reciprocal means that the roots of the polynomial cannot be grouped in
pairs that lie symmetric to the unit circle (cf. Henrici, 1988, p.496). Not however that this is a non–generic
case. Moreover the first statement is true even in this case. (Maybe the other two cases go through as well
with a self–reciprocal polynomial in the special case of a degree two polynomial.
14The conditions are sufficient but only generically necessary.
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(Case II) and (Case III) both require
1+ c1+ c2+ c3 > 0, (A.23)
−1+ c1− c2+ c3 < 0 (A.24)
and in addition (Case II)
c23− c1c3+ c2−1 > 0 (A.25)
or (Case III) 15
|c1|> 3. (A.26)
A.1.2.2. Real Parts Smaller One. E–stability requires that the real parts of the roots
of the matrices (33) to (35) are smaller than one. The following result is known as the
Routh–Hurwitz theorem:
THEOREM A.1.5. Consider a real n× n matrix A with characteristic equation λ n +
b1λ n−1+ . . .+bn−1λ +bn = 0. Then the eigenvalues λ have negative real parts if and only
if ∀k = 1 . . .n : ∆k > 0, where
∆k = det


b1 1 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
b3 b2 b1 1 0 0 . . . 0
b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
b2k−1 b2k−2 b2k−3 b2k−4 b2k−5 b2k−6 . . . b2k−1

 . (A.27)
PROOF. Gradshteyn and Ryzhik 2000, p. 1076 
The real parts of a matrix A are less than one whenever the real parts of A− I are
negative and thus the proposition can be used to derive conditions for E–stability. For a
(2×2) matrix A straightforward calculations show that a necessary and sufficient condition
for the eigenvalues to have negative real parts is that det(A)> 0 and tr(A)< 0.
A.1.3. Determinacy.
A.1.3.1. No Bonds–Contemporaneous Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4.2. The coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of
A−1B are
c1 =−β (φz+σy)+κ+σyφz+σy+κφpi , c2 =
σyβ
φz+σy+κφpi
. (A.28)
For determinacy we need both roots to be inside the unit circle, which is equivalent to the
conditions (A.16) and (A.17). Using the assumptions κ > 0, σy > 0, 0 < β < 1, φpi ≥ 0
and φz ≥ 0 it is easy to see that (A.16) is always fulfilled, while (A.17) is true if and only if
(39) holds. 
15Note that (Case II) and (Case III) are not disjunct. As noted by Woodford (2003b) this can be achieved
by demanding that c23− c1c3+ c2−1 < 0 in (Case III).
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A.1.3.2. No Bonds–Forward Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4.4. The coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of
A−1B are
c1 = σ−1y (κ(φpi −1)+φz)−1−β , c2 = (1−σ−1y φz)β . (A.29)
For determinacy we need both roots to be inside the unit circle, which is equivalent to the
conditions (A.16) and (A.17). It can easily be verified that these conditions are equivalent
to (44), (43) and
φz < σy(1+β−1). (A.30)
Note that (43) is equivalent to 1−φpi < 1−βκ φz. Rewriting (44) yields φz < 2σy+ κ1+β (1−
φpi) and thus with the previous result φz < 2σy+ 1−β1+β φz which is equivalent to (A.30). As a
consequence determinacy is equivalent to (44) and (43). 
A.1.3.3. No Bonds–Lagged Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4.6. In order to be able to apply the conditions of propo-
sition A.1.4 look at the characteristic polynomial of B−1A given by λ 3+ c1λ 2+ c2λ + c3,
where
c1 =−σyβ +κ+σyσyβ , c2 =
σy−φzβ
σyβ
, c3 =
φpiκ+φz
σyβ
. (A.31)
It can be verified easily that (Case I) is equivalent to (49) and (48). Moreover (Case II) and
(Case III) are satisfied whenever the reverse inequalities (51) and (50) hold and in addition
one of the inequalities (A.25) or (A.26) are satisfied respectively. Inequality (A.25) is
equivalent to
κ2φ2pi +κ(σy(1+β )+2φz+κ)φpi +φ
2
z +(κ−σy(β 2−β −1))φz+σ2y β (1−β )> 0.
(A.32)
Recall that by assumption φpi ≥ 0, φz ≥ 0, κ > 0, σy > 0 and 0 < β < 1. Thus condition
(A.32) is always satisfied, so that (Case II) and (Case III) are equivalent to (51) and (50).

A.1.3.4. Positive Bonds–Contemporaneous Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.3. Note from (55) that A−1B is block diagonal and thus
the eigenvalues are given by (β−1− γ1)−1 and the eigenvalues of the upper left (2× 2)
block. This block in turn is identical to (38).
Passive fiscal policy (56) is equivalent to (β−1− γ1)−1 > 1. Therefore determinacy
requires both remaining roots, the eigenvalues of (38), to be inside the unit circle. By
proposition 1.4.2 this is equivalent to (39).
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Now consider the case of active fiscal policy (58), which is equivalent to (β−1 −
γ1)−1 < 1. In this case one eigenvalue of (38) has to be inside and one has to be out-
side the unit circle, which is equivalent to condition (A.20). Condition (A.20) in turn is
equivalent to one of the following two conditions being true
(c1 < 1+ c2)∧ (−c1 > 1+ c2), (A.33)
(−c1 < 1+ c2)∧ (c1 > 1+ c2). (A.34)
where c1 and c2 are the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of (38), given by
(A.28). It is easily verified that the first region of determinacy (A.33) is given by (59)
whereas the second region of determinacy (A.34) is empty. 
A.1.3.5. Positive Bonds–Forward Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.6. Again A−1B (67) is block diagonal and thus the eigen-
values are (β−1− γ1)−1 and the eigenvalues of the upper left (2×2) block. This block in
turn is identical to (42).
Under passive fiscal policy (68) we have (β−1− γ1)−1 > 1 and so both eigenvalues of
(42) have to be inside the unit circle. By proposition 1.4.4 this is equivalent to (44) and
(43).
Active fiscal policy (71) is equivalent to (β−1−γ1)−1 < 1. Thus for determinacy one of
the remaining two roots has to be inside and the other one outside the unit circle, which, as
seen in the previous proof, is true if and only if conditions (A.33) and (A.34) hold, where c1
and c2 are the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial (A.29). Straightforward algebra
shows that (A.33) is equivalent to (73) and (72), while (A.34) is equivalent to (75) and
(74). 
A.1.3.6. Positive Bonds–Lagged Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.9. Note that A−1B (83) is block triangular and thus the
eigenvalues are given by (β−1− γ1)−1 and the eigenvalues of the upper left (3×3) block.
This block in turn is identical to (47).
If fiscal policy is passive (84) then (β−1− γ1)−1 > 1. Thus a determinate equilibrium
requires that two eigenvalues of (47) are inside and one is outside unit circle, which by
proposition 1.4.6 is equivalent to (88)-(87) or (86)-(85).
If fiscal policy is active (89) then (β−1− γ1)−1 < 1. For a determinate equilibrium
one eigenvalue of (47) has to be inside and two outside the unit circle. The characteristic
polynomial of A−1B is given by λ 3+ c1λ 2+ c2λ + c3 with:
c1 =
σy−φzβ
φpiκ+φz
, c2 =−κ+σy(1+β )φpiκ+φz , c3 =
σyβ
φpiκ+φz
. (A.35)
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Then one root is inside and two are outside the unit circle whenever one of the three cases
defined by conditions (A.21)-(A.26) holds. It is easily verified that (Case I) is equivalent
to (91) and (90). It remains to show that (Case II) and (Case III) are empty. Consider first
(Case II) and note that condition (A.25) is equivalent to
κ2φ2pi +κ(σy(1+β )+2φz+κ)φpi +φ
2
z +(κ−σy(β 2−β −1))φz+σ2y β (1−β )< 0.
(A.36)
It is easy to see that (A.36) contradicts the assumptions φpi ≥ 0, φz ≥ 0, κ > 0, σy > 0 and
0 < β < 1, so that (Case II) is empty. For (Case III) note that condition (A.26) can be
written as ∣∣∣−φzβ +σyφpiκ+φz ∣∣∣> 3⇔ (φz <−σy+3φpiκ3−β ∨φz < σy−3φpiκβ +3 ). (A.37)
However φz <−σy+3φpiκ3−β < 0 contradicts the assumption φz ≥ 0. Condition (A.24) is equiv-
alent to κ1+β (1−φpi)+2σy < φz. Together with φz <
σy−3φpiκ
β +3
(the second part of (A.37))
this implies κ1+β (1−φpi)+2σy <
σy−3φpiκ
β+3 ⇔ φpi <− 12βκ [σy(2β 2+7β+5)+κ(β+3)]< 0
contradicting the assumption φpi ≥ 0. Thus (Case III) is empty too. 
A.1.4. Rational Expectations Equilibrium Representations.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.4. Our solution method follows Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) p.260. Rewrite the system (22) as
xt = Jxt+1+A−1Cut +A−1Dηt+1.
where J = A−1B is given by (55). The Jordan decomposition J = QΛQ−1 is given by
Λ= diag(1/λ1,1/λ2,1/λ3)
and
Q−1 =
 − µ4κµ1(µ3−µ4) − 1µ1(µ3−µ4) 0µ3
κµ2(µ3−µ4)
1
µ2(µ3−µ4) 0
− µ3µ1−µ4µ2κµ1µ2(µ3−µ4) −
µ1−µ2
µ1µ2(µ3−µ4) 1
,
where µ1 =
β (λ1−λ3)
−λ1(βφz+κ)+κφpi +φz , µ2 =
β (λ2−λ3)
−λ2(βφz+κ)+κφpi +φz , µ3 = λ1β − 1 and µ4 =
λ2β − 1. Recall that the endogenous variables xt = (pˆit , yˆt , bˆt)′ contain two free variables
and one predetermined variable. To obtain a determinate solution we need exactly two
restrictions. If |λi| > 1 then stationarity requires that (Q−1)i,·xt + kigˆt = 0, where (Q−1)i,·
is the ith row of Q−1. Thus a determinate equilibrium demands that two out of the three
roots are outside the unit circle. The roots can be computed as λ1 = p+
√
p2−q, λ2 =
83
p−
√
p2−q and λ3 = β−1−γ1, where p= σy+κ+β (σy+φz)2βσy and q=
σy+φz+κφpi
σyβ . Stationarity
then requires that the corresponding two of the following three restrictions hold
(Q−1)1,·xt + k1gˆt = 0 ⇔ (λ2β −1)pit +κct + k1gˆt = 0, (A.38)
(Q−1)2,·xt + k2gˆt = 0 ⇔ (λ1β −1)pit +κct + k2gˆt = 0, (A.39)
(Q−1)3,·xt + k3gˆt = 0 ⇔ bt−1− µ3µ1−µ4µ2κµ1µ2(µ3−µ4)pit−
µ1−µ2
µ1µ2(µ3−µ4)ct + k3gˆt = 0.(A.40)
Consider first the case where |λ1| > 1, |λ2| > 1 and |λ3| < 1. Combining (A.38), (A.39)
and (21) yields the monetarist solution (M) given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = Γ2 and c¯2, where c¯2 is
the unique solution to (31). The roots of c¯1 are {0,0,λ3} and so passive fiscal policy (56)
guarantees stationarity of the monetarist solution. Proposition 1.5.3 proves that there is a
unique stationary solution under the conditions (56) and (57), which thus must be equal to
the monetarist solution.
Next assume |λ1|< 1, |λ2|> 1 and |λ3|> 1. Recall that by assumption κ > 0, σy > 0,
0 < β < 1 and φz > 0. It follows that p > 1. If p2−q > 0 then |λ1|> p > 1. If p2−q < 0
we have q > p2 > 1, so |λ1| =
√
p2− (p2−q) = √q > 1 contradicting the assumption
|λ1|< 1.
Finally assume |λ1| > 1, |λ2| < 1 and |λ3| > 1. Combining (A.38), (A.40) and (21)
yields the fiscalist solution (F) given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = (φpiv,φyv,βλ3v) and c¯2, where c¯2 is
the unique solution to (31) and v is
v = 1
(λ2β −1)φz+κ(λ3−φpi)
[ −κ(λ2−λ3)
(λ2β −1)(λ2−λ3)
β−1(λ2β −1)φz+β−1κ(λ2−φpi)
]
. (A.41)
By proposition 1.5.3 there is a determinate solution in this case. By assumption |λ3|> 1, so
the monetarist solution is explosive. Therefore the fiscalist solution must be the determinate
solution. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.7. The solutions (M), (F1) and (F2) can be computed
following the same steps as in the proof of proposition 1.5.4. Each solution suppresses two
of the three eigenvalues in A−1B (67). The eigenvalues of B−1A are λ1 = −p+
√
p2−q,
λ2 =−p−
√
p2−q and λ3 = β−1− γ1, where p = κ(φpi−1)+φz−σy(1+β )2β (σy−φz) and q =
σy
β (σy−φz) .
The monetarist solution (M) is given by c¯0 = 0, c¯1 = Γ2 and c¯2, where c¯2 is the unique
solution to (31). Both fiscalist solutions (F1) and (F2) are of the general form c¯0 = 0,
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c¯1 = (ϕpiv,ϕyv,βλ3v) and c¯2, where c¯2 is the unique solution to (31) and 16
v = 1
(λ1,2β −1)ϕz+κ(λ3−ϕpi)
[ −κ(λ1,2−λ3)
(λ1,2β −1)(λ1,2−λ3)
β−1(λ1,2β −1)ϕz+β−1κ(λ1,2−ϕpi)
]
. (A.42)
The two fiscalist solutions differ only in the parameter λ1,2. In case of (F1) λ1,2 = λ1 and
in case of (F2) λ1,2 = λ2. It remains to divide the determinate region given in proposition
1.5.6 among the three candidates (M), (F1) and (F2).
By construction the roots of the monetarist solution (M) are {0,0,λ3}, while the roots
of the two fiscalist solutions are {λ1,0,0} and {0,λ2,0} in case of (F1) and (F2) respec-
tively. Obviously the monetarist solution (M) is stationary provided fiscal policy is pas-
sive. Therefore the determinate solution under the conditions (68)–(69) must be equal to
the monetarist solution. In case of active fiscal policy note first that the monetarist solution
(M) is always explosive. Thus for active fiscal policy rules the fiscalist solutions (F1) and
(F2) are the only candidates for a determinate solution.
Consider first solution (F1). In the following we will prove that under active fiscal
policy (71) the conditions (72)–(73) and φz >σy or (74)–(75) and φz <σy are sufficient for
|λ2| > 1. Then, the only remaining candidate for a determinate equilibrium is the fiscalist
solution (F1). As proposition 1.5.3 guarantees that these conditions are also sufficient for
determinacy (F1) must be the determinate solution. The first step is to observe that either
q < 0 or q > 1 as φz > 0 and 0 < β < 1. Now note that under (73) and φz > σy or (75)
and φz < σy we have q−2p+1 =−1+ββ
κ(1+β )−1(φpi−1)+φz−2σy
σy−φz < 0. The following lemma
establishes that this is enough to ensure |λ2|> 1.
LEMMA A.1.6. Let p,q ∈R. A sufficient condition for |λ2| > 1 is (q− 2p+ 1 < 0)∧
[(q < 0)∨ (q > 1)] .
PROOF. If p2 < q then |λ2|= |p+
√
p2−q|=
√
p2− (p2−q)=√q. As q > p2 > 0 it
follows that q > 1 and so |λ2| > 1. If p2 > q then q−2p+1 < 0⇔ (p−1)2 < p2−q⇒
−p−
√
p2−q <−1 and so |λ2|> 1. 
Next consider the solution (F2). Along the same lines as above we will show that un-
der active fiscal policy (71) the conditions (72)–(73) and φz < σy or (74)–(75) and φz > σy
imply |λ1| > 1. This will identify (F2) as the only candidate for a determinate equilib-
rium. Again the conditions are also sufficient for determinacy (F2) by proposition 1.4.2
and so (F2) is the determinate equilibrium. The following lemma establishes conditions
analogous to lemma A.1.6 that are sufficient for |λ1|> 1.
16Explicit formulas for the compound parameters ϕpi and ϕz are given in equation (A.9).
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LEMMA A.1.7. Let p,q ∈R. A sufficient condition for |λ1| > 1 is (q+ 2p+ 1 > 0)∧
[(q < 0)∨ (q > 1)] .
PROOF. If p2 < q then |λ1|= |− p+
√
p2−q|=
√
p2− (p2−q) =√q. As q> p2 > 0
it follows that q > 1 so that |λ1|> 1. If p2 > q then q+2p+1 < 0⇔ (p+1)2 < p2−q⇒
−p+
√
p2−q > 1 and so |λ1|> 1. 
As argued above it is easy to see that either q < 0 or q > 1. Moreover q+ 2p+ 1 =
κ(φpi−1)+(1−β )φz
β (σy−φz) . It is easy to see that the conditions (72) and φz < σy or (74) and φz > σy
imply q+2p+1 < 0 and so |λ1|> 1 by virtue of lemma A.1.7. 
A.1.5. Learnability.
A.1.5.1. No Bonds–Contemporaneous Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4.3. Recall that due to the special structure (c¯1 = Γ2 = 0)
a necessary and sufficient condition for E–stability is that the real parts of the eigenvalues
of Γ1 = A−1B are less than one. By the Routh–Hurwitz proposition A.1.5 this is equivalent
to |A−1B− I|> 0 and tr(A−1B− I)< 0. Straightforward algebra shows that |A−1B− I|> 0
is equivalent to (40), whereas
−tr(A−1B− I) = [κ(φpi −1)+φz(1−β )]+κφpi +φz+σy(1−β )
φz+σy+φpiκ
> 0.
The term in square brackets is positive by condition (40). By assumption κ > 0, φpi ≥ 0,
φz ≥ 0, σy > 0 and 0 < β < 1 and therefore the last three terms are nonnegative. 
A.1.5.2. No Bonds–Forward Data Rules.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.4.5. As in the contemporaneous data case, a necessary and
sufficient condition for E–stability is that |A−1B− I|> 0 and tr(A−1B− I)< 0. It is easily
checked that condition |A−1B− I|> 0 is equivalent to (45). Additionally −tr(A−1B− I) =
[κ(φpi −1)+φz(1−β )]+βφz+σy(1−β )> 0. The term in square brackets is positive by
condition (45). By assumption φz ≥ 0, σy > 0 and 0 < β < 1 and therefore the last two
terms are nonnegative. 
A.1.5.3. Positive Bonds–Contemporaneous Data Rules (Monetarist Solution).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.5. First note that due to the special structure of c¯1 = Γ2
we have Γ1c¯1 = Γ1Γ2 = 0. Therefore the derivatives (29)–(30) simplify to Γ1, c¯′1⊗Γ1 and
ϕ ′⊗Γ1 respectively. By assumption the eigenvalues of ϕ are inside the unit circle and by
construction the eigenvalues of c¯1 are {0,0,β−1− γ1}. The eigenvalues of the Kronecker
product of two matrices are the products of the eigenvalues of each matrix. Thus the real
parts of the eigenvalues of all three derivatives are smaller than one if and only if the real
parts of the eigenvalues of the matrices Γ1 and (β−1− γ1)Γ1 are smaller than one. Γ1 is a
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blocktriangular matrix with the blocks Γ˜1 and 0 on the diagonal, where Γ˜1 is the upper left
2×2 block. Thus the eigenvalues of Γ1 are the eigenvalues the eigenvalues of Γ˜1 and 0.
Under passive fiscal policy (61) we have β−1− γ1 < 1. Under active monetary policy
(62) the real parts of the eigenvalues of Γ˜1 are smaller than one (cf. proposition 1.4.3)
and so the real parts of the eigenvalues of Γ1 and (β−1− γ1)Γ1 are smaller than one. This
proves the first part of the proposition.
If fiscal policy is active (63) then β−1− γ1 > 1. Thus the condition that the real parts
of the eigenvalues of (β−1− γ1)Γ1 are smaller than one implies that the real parts of the
eigenvalues of Γ1 are smaller than one. By proposition A.1.5 the real parts of the eigen-
values of (β−1− γ1)Γ1 are smaller than one if and only if det((β−1− γ1)Γ˜1− I) > 0 and
tr((β−1− γ1)Γ˜1− I) < 0. Straightforward algebra shows that these two conditions can be
written as (64) and (65). 
A.1.5.4. Positive Bonds–Forward Data Rules (Monetarist Solution).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.5.8. The proof parallels the proof of proposition 1.5.5.
The matrix Γ1 is again blocktriangular. Denote the upper left 2× 2 block by Γ˜1, then
the lower right block is 0. The same argument as in the proof of proposition 1.5.5 leads
to the conclusion that the monetarist solution is E–stable under passive fiscal policy (77)
and active monetary policy (78). Provided fiscal policy is active (79) E–stability is again
equivalent to the conditions det((β−1−γ1)Γ1− I)> 0 and tr((β−1−γ1)Γ1− I)< 0, which
can be written as (80) and (81). 
A.2. Appendix to Chapter 2
DEFINITION A.2.1. For x ∈Rn and f : Rn→Rn×n consider the autonomous system of
differential equations
x˙ = f (x).
A set S⊂Rn is said to be
(1) stable if for each ε there is a δ such that all trajectories starting in Nδ (S) never
leave Nε(S),
(2) attracting if the trajectories ultimately go to S, x→ S, which means that
limt→∞ dist(x(t),S) = 0, where dist(x,S) = miny∈S |x− y|.
If S is stable and attracting then it is said to be locally asymptotically stable. If S is attracting
for all initial conditions, the asymptotic stability is said to be global (cf. Kushner and Yin,
2003, chapter 4.2.2).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2.8. Vectorisation of the differential equation for d yields
vec(d˙) = (A+ I⊗β (b− b¯))vec(d), where A = DTd(b¯)− I. Note that the assumptions on
the eigenvalues imply that m eigenvalues are equal to zero with a full eigenspace and the
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remaining eigenvalues of A have negative real parts. Therefore the Jordan decomposition
of A can be written as
A = QΛQ−1 with Λ=
[
Λ1 0
0 0
]
and Q−1 =
[
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
]
,
where Λ1 contains all eigenvalues with negative real parts. Let w = Q−1vec(d) and B =
Q−1(I⊗β (b− b¯)Q. Partitioning w and B correspondingly we can represent the system of
differential equations for vec(d) as
w˙1 = [Λ1+B1(b)]w1, (A.43)
w˙2 = B2(b)w2, (A.44)
with B1(b¯) = 0 and B2(b¯) = 0. Note that a, b, c and w1 form an independent subsystem.
According to standard stability theory a necessary condition for local asymptotic stability
of the solution a ≡ a¯, b ≡ b¯, c ≡ c¯, w1 ≡ 0 is that none of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
of the subsystem has a positive real part, i.e. that the derivatives of the T-map have no
eigenvalue with a real part larger than 1. A sufficient condition is that all eigenvalues of the
Jacobian have negative real parts, i.e. the eigenvalues of the derivatives of the T-map have
real parts smaller than 1 apart from m eigenvalues of DTd(b¯) equal to one.
To complete the proof we show that local asymptotic stability of the solution a ≡ a¯,
b≡ b¯, c≡ c¯, w1 ≡ 0 for the subsystem a, b, c, w1 is equivalent to local asymptotic stability
of the set Ξb¯ for the system a, b, c and d. First we introduce the notation ξv = (ξ ′v,1,ξ
′
v,2)
′,
ξv,1 = (vec(a)′,vec(b)′,vec(c)′,w′1)
′, ξv,2 = w2, and ξ¯v,1 = (vec(a¯)′,vec(b¯)′,vec(c¯)′,0′)′.
Now note that for
M =
[
I 0
0 Q
]
it follows that vec(ξ ′) =Mξv. Assume first that ξ¯v,1 is an unstable solution of the subsystem
in ξv,1. Then for some ε > 0 we can find for all δ an initial value ξv,1(0) with |ξv,1(0)−
ξ¯v,1|< δ such that for some t > 0 we have |ξv,1(t)− ξ¯v,1|> ε|M−1|. It follows that
dist(ξ (t),Ξb¯) = min
ξ¯∈Ξb¯
|vec(ξ (t)′)−vec(ξ¯ ′)|= min
ξ¯v,2∈Rm
|M(ξv(t)− ξ¯v)|
≥ min
ξ¯v,2∈Rm
|ξv(t)− ξ¯v|/|M−1|= |ξv,1(t)− ξ¯v,1|/|M−1|> ε,
so Ξb¯ is unstable. Now assume that ξ¯v,1 is an asymptotically stable solution of the sub-
system in ξv,1. Then there is a δ > 0 for each ε > 0 such that for all initial values
|ξv,1(0)− ξ¯v,1|< δ we have |ξv,1(t)− ξ¯v,1|< ε/|M|. Therefore
dist(ξ (t),Ξb¯) = min
ξ¯v,2∈Rm
|M(ξv(t)− ξ¯v)| ≤ |M||ξv,1(t)− ξ¯v,1|< ε,
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so Ξb¯ is stable. Now it follows immediately that
lim
t→∞dist(ξ (t),Ξb¯) ≤ |M| limt→∞ |ξv,1(t)− ξ¯v,1|= 0,
so that Ξb¯ is also attracting. The last equality uses the fact that ξ¯v,1 is attracting for the
subsystem in ξv,1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2.11. The purely forward looking version of the model
(93) can be written in first order form as[
yn
wn
]
=
[
β κρ−1
0 ρ−1
][
yn+1
wn+1
]
+
[
I 0
0 ρ−1
][
ηn+1
ϑn+1
]
or
xn = Jxn+1+Lξn+1.
Our solution method follows closely Evans and Honkapohja (2001) p. 261. Let J =QΛQ−1
be the Jordan normal form of J, where Λ is a block diagonal matrix. We partition (y′n,w′n)′
and Q−1 conformably as (y′1,n,y
′
2,n,w
′
n)
′ and
Q−1 =
[
Q11(1,1) Q11(1,2) Q12(1)
Q11(2,1) Q11(2,2) Q12(2)
Q21(1) Q21(2) Q22(2)
]
.
The system becomes
Q−1
[
y1,n
y2,n
wn
]
=
[
Λ1(1) 0 0
0 Λ1(2) 0
0 0 Λ2
]
Q−1
[
y1,n+1
y2,n+1
wn+1
]
+Q−1
[
L1(1)
L1(2)
L2
]
ξn+1.
The matrixΛ1(1) contains the unstable roots with modulus less than 1. Stationarity requires
that the restrictions
[Q11(1,1),Q11(1,2),Q12(1)]
[
y1,n
y2,n
wn
]
= 0 (A.45)
hold. Due to the blockdiagonal structure of J we have β = Q11Λ1Q−111 . Inverting Q11 we
get the solutions
yn = Q−111
(
Λ˜
(
Q11xn−1+Q12wn−1+L1ξn
)−Q12wn), (A.46)
where
Λ˜1 =
[
0 0
0 Λ1(2)−1
]
.
It follows from (A.46) that b¯=Q11Λ˜1Q−111 . From proposition 2.2.10 we know that a neces-
sary condition for E-stability is that all eigenvalues of DTb(b¯) = b¯′⊗β + I⊗β b¯ have neg-
ative real parts. We will show below that DTb(b¯) has at least one eigenvalue equal to 2, so
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that this condition is violated. Use the decompositions β = Q11Λ1Q−111 and b¯ = Q11Λ˜1Q
−1
11
to rewrite DTb(b¯) as
DTb(b¯) = (Q11Λ˜1Q−111 )
′⊗Q11Λ1Q−111 + I⊗Q11Λ1Λ˜1Q−111
= Q−111
′Λ˜1Q11′⊗Q11Λ1Q−111 + I⊗Q11Λ1Λ˜1Q−111
= (Q−111
′⊗Q11)(Λ˜1⊗Λ1+ I⊗Λ1Λ˜1)(Q11′⊗Q−111 )
Noting that Q−111
′⊗Q11 is the inverse of Q11′⊗Q−111 it follows that the spectrum of b¯′⊗
β + I⊗β b¯ is the same as that of Λ˜1⊗Λ1+ I⊗Λ1Λ˜1. Let k be the order of indeterminacy
(which is also the dimension of Λ1(2)), i.e. the number of free variables (or the dimension
of yn) less the number of restrictions in (A.45) (or the dimension of Λ1(1)). The lower right
block of the matrix Λ˜1⊗Λ1+ I⊗Λ1Λ˜1 is given by Λ1(2)−1⊗Λ1+ I⊗Λ1Λ˜1, which in turn
has the structure 
Λ1/λ1+Λ1Λ˜1 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 Λ1/λk +Λ1Λ˜1
 (A.47)
where λi is the i-th diagonal element of Λ1(2). The i-th block of the previous matrix in turn
has the structure [
Λ1(1)/λi 0
0 Λ1(2)/λi+ I
]
(A.48)
So there are k blocks of the formΛ1(2)/λi+I, i= 1 . . .k, the i-th diagonal element of which
is equal to 2. Thus there are k eigenvalues of DTb(b¯) equal to 2 so that all general form
representations with k > 0 (i.e. b¯ 6= 0) are E-unstable. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3.1. Proposition 2.3.1 is a special case of Delyon (1996)
theorem 4. We use results from the book Benveniste et al. (1990) to show that the assump-
tions of Delyon (1996) theorem 4 are satisfied under our assumptions (A), (B), (Stab) and
(Proj). From now on we refer to Benveniste et al. (1990) as BMP. First consider assump-
tions (MK1-3) of Delyon (1996). BMP show on page 291 that given assumptions (B1-2)
the first two inequalities of (MK1) hold for all q≥ 1. Let g(x) be a function on Rk. Given
q≥ 0 define
[g]q = sup
x1 6=x2
|g(x1)−g(x2)|
(x1− x2|[1+ |x1|q+ |x2|q) . (A.49)
If g(x) = |x|q then [g]q−1 < ∞ for all q > 0 (cf. BMP p.290). So by lemma 9(c) p.268
of BMP the third inequality of (MK1) holds for all q > 0. Thus we have established that
(MK1) holds for all q> 0. (MK2) is the same as our assumption (A2). By assumption (A3)
H(θ ,x) is twice continuously differentiable with bounded second derivatives on Q. Every
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continuously differentiable function with bounded partial derivatives satisfies a Lipschitz
condition. This implies that there exist constants L1, L2 such that for allθ ,θ ′ ∈ Q and all
x,x′ ∈Rl
|∂H(θ ,x)/∂x−∂H(θ ,x′)/∂x′| ≤ L1|x− x′|,
|H(θ ,0)−H(θ ′,0)| ≤ L2|θ −θ ′|,
|∂H(θ ,x)/∂x−∂H(θ ′,x)/∂x| ≤ L2|θ −θ ′|.
As argued by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) on p.129 in the proof of lemma 6.2 this implies
that
|H(θ ,x)−H(θ ,x′)| ≤ L1|x− x′|(1+ |x|+ |x′|),
|H(θ ,x)−H(θ ′,x)| ≤ L2|θ −θ ′|(1+ |x|).
It is now easy to see that H(θ ,x) is of class Li1(Q) as defined by BMP on p.262. As a
consequence we can apply proposition 10 p.270 of BMP which guarantees that for every θ
the Markov chain (118) has a unique invariant measure µθ and that for some p1, p2
|vθ (x)| ≤ C(1+ |x|p1),
|Πθvθ (x)−Πθ ′vθ ′(x)| ≤ C|θ −θ ′|(1+ |x|p2).
It follows that (MK1-3) hold for p = max{p1, p2} and any q > 2p. Together with the as-
sumptions (A4) and (Proj) on the projections Delyon (1996) shows in the proof of theorem
4 that Xn is bounded in Lq for all q > 0. Next let en = γnρn(θn−1,Xn) and note that
lim
k→∞
k
∑
n=0
γnen =
∞
∑
n=0
γ2n |ρn(θn−1,Xn)| ≤C2
∞
∑
n=0
γ2n (1+ |Xn|p2)< ∞ a.s. (A.50)
because the expectation is finite. So en satisfies the A-stability condition (cf. Delyon, 1996,
equation 6).
Thus assumption 1 of Delyon (1996, theorem 4) holds because (MK1-3) hold and due
to our assumption (Proj). Assumption 2 corresponds to our assumption (A1). Given η and
p we can choose q sufficiently large that q/pη ≥ 2, because (MK1-3) hold for all q > 0.
Thus ∑γq/pηn < ∑γ2n < ∞ by assumption (A1). From this and assumption (A4) it follows
that assumption 3 of Delyon (1996, theorem 4) holds. Assumption 4 is incorporated in
our assumption (Proj). Finally, en = γnρn(θn−1,Xn) satisfies the A-stability condition (cf.
Delyon, 1996, equation 6). So all assumptions of Delyon (1996, theorem 4) are satisfied
and the result follows. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3.3. Let θn = vec(ξn,Rn), γn = n−1,
H(θn,Xn) = vec(R−1n−1zn−1z
′
n−1(T (ξn−1)−ξn−1), znz′n−Rn−1), (A.51)
ρn(θn,Xn) = − nn+1 vec(0, znz
′
n−Rn−1). (A.52)
With these definitions the learning algorithm (124) can be written in the form of the gen-
eral recursive stochastic algorithm (117). It is easy to verify that assumption (A1) holds
for a gain γn = n−1. It is also easy to see that assumption (A2) and (A3) hold for the
functions H and ρn for all θ ∈ Q, where Q is some compact subset of Rk. (A4) holds
by assumption on the projections ψn. The stochastic process (126) for the state vector
X ′n = (1,y′n−1,w
′
n,ζ ′n,y′n−2,w
′
n−1,ζ
′
n−1) can be written in the form (118) with the definitions
A(θ) =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ta(a,b) Tb(b) Tc(b,c) Td(b,d) 0 0 0
0 0 ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ϕ 0 0 0
0 I 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 I 0 0 0

, B(θ)≡

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 I 0
0 0 I
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

,
and the vector of white noise disturbances W ′n = (1,ϑ ′n,ε ′n). Obviously Wn satisfies (B1).
As the system matrices are continuous functions of θ it follows that |A(θ)| < K1 and
|B(θ)| < K3 for some constants K1, K3 and all θ in a compact subset Q ⊂ Rk. The Lip-
schitz conditions of A(θ) and B(θ) are also readily satisfied on a compact set. Moreover
the eigenvalues of A(θ) are the same as those of Tb(b), ρ and ϕ . The eigenvalues of ϕ are
by construction of the common factor representation inside the unit circle, while those of ρ
and Tb(b) were assumed to be inside the unit circle. It follows that there exist constants K2
and 0<ω < 1 such that |A(θ)n|<K2ωn. So (B2) is also satisfied. Assumption (Proj) is as-
sumed to hold. The set Θb¯ is assumed to be a locally asymptotically stable set of the mean
ODE (120). Under this assumption the existence of a Lyapunov function as required by
assumption (Stab) follows from the converse Lyapunov theorems of Wilson (1969) and Lin
et al. (1996). Wilson (1969) provides a proof for the case of a locally asymptotically stable
set, whereas Lin et al. (1996) give a more detailed exposition applied to global asymptotic
stability. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.4.1. As the model is purely forward looking E-stability of
the MSV solution implies E-stability of common factor sunspots (cf. corollary 2.2.9). The
necessary and sufficient condition for E-stability of the MSV solution is condition (132)
(cf. appendix for details). To prove the existence of sunspots rewrite the model in the first
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order form Axn = BEnxn+1+ εn, where xn = (pˆin, yˆn)′. The system matrices are
A =
[
1 −κ
0 σy
]
, B =
[
β 0
1−φpi σy−φy
]
. (A.53)
The coefficients of the characteristic polynomial of A−1B are
c1 = σ−1y (κ(φpi −1)+φy)−1−β , c2 = (1−σ−1y φy)β . (A.54)
For indeterminacy of order one there must be one eigenvalue inside and one outside the unit
circle, which is equivalent to the condition |c1|> |c2+1| (cf. appendix A.2 for an overview
of eigenvalue criteria). It is straightforward to show that this condition holds if and only if
one of two sets of conditions is fulfilled. Either (132) and (133) or the same conditions with
the inequalities reversed must hold. However, as argued above E-stability requires (132)
to hold, so only the first set of conditions yields E-stable common factor representations.
Instability of general form sunspot representations follows from proposition 2.2.11. 
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